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ABSTRACT 
  How can law best mitigate harm from crises like storms, epidemics, 
and financial meltdowns? This Article uses the law and economics 
framework of property rules and liability rules to analyze crisis 
responses across multiple areas of law, focusing particularly on the 
ways the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) battled the 2008–09 financial 
crisis. 
  Remarkably, the IRS’s responses to that crisis cost more than 
Congress’s higher-profile bank bailouts. Despite their costs, many of 
the IRS’s responses were underinclusive, causing preventable layoffs 
and foreclosures. This Article explains these failures and demonstrates 
that the optimal response to crises is to shift from harsh property rules 
to compensatory liability rules, temporarily. Arranging such a shift in 
advance further mitigates harm when crises arrive. 
  This analysis also provides new insights for the broader literature 
on property rules and liability rules. For example, arranging in advance 
for temporary moves to liability rules during crises can avoid windfalls, 
allow speedier relief, and encourage flexible private contracts. These 
lessons have practical applications in areas as far afield as how 
constitutional law and patent law respond to epidemics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the famous 1908 torts case Ploof v. Putnam,1 a “violent 
tempest” arose, causing Sylvester Ploof to moor his boat at a dock 
owned by Henry Putnam,2 who expelled the boat, causing Ploof to 
shipwreck.3 Ploof successfully sued Putnam, and the case established 
that property owners cannot exclude trespassers seeking refuge during 
times of necessity.4 The similarly famous 1910 torts case Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transportation Co.5 refined Ploof. In that case, a storm 
caused a boater to remain moored to a dock, seriously damaging it.6 
The court required the boater to compensate the dock owner for this 
damage.7 These two cases are the foundation for tort law’s doctrine of 
necessity.8 
Tax law should adopt the insights of Ploof and Vincent to minimize 
the damage to taxpayers, to tax revenues, and to the broader economy 
during financial crises. Both tort law and tax law have property rules 
and liability rules, which are “workhorse concepts that permeate every 
corner of the economic analysis of law.”9 Property rules give 
entitlement holders protection through coercive measures, while 
liability rules give entitlement holders only the right to compensation. 
For example, in normal times, dock owners are protected by property 
rules and are free to decide who may moor at their docks. But Ploof 
established that emergencies like storms turn off this property-rule 
protection, and Vincent held that liability-rule protection temporarily 
 
 1. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
 2. Id. at 188.  
 3. Id. at 188–89.  
 4. Id. at 189; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 197(1), 263(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1965).  
 5. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).  
 6. Id. at 221. 
 7. Id. at 222. 
 8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmt. g, cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (citing 
Ploof and Vincent).  
 9. Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1405 (2009); see also 
Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1169, 1187–95 (2013) (demonstrating that tax law has both property and liability rules); cf. 
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (introducing the distinction between 
property rules and liability rules).  
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applies instead.10 
Many tax requirements have property-rule protection; that is, the 
taxpayer must comply on pain of draconian tax increases regardless of 
the size of the violation.11 Other requirements are protected by liability 
rules, where a taxpayer that fails the requirement owes the IRS 
compensatory taxes proportional to the violation.12 Under either rule, 
the IRS holds the entitlement, like the dock owners in Ploof and 
Vincent. 
Property rules in tax often make sense during times of financial 
calm, for a number of reasons, such as property rules’ ability to deter 
taxpayers from violating tax law requirements and the potential 
mathematical complexity of implementing liability rules.13 But during 
financial crises, taxpayers may be unable to comply with some 
requirements due to cash shortages or other effects of the crisis. 
Draconian property rules can have disastrous consequences for 
taxpayers already in distress, leading to bankruptcies, layoffs, 
foreclosures, and financial contagion.14 
During the 2008–09 financial crisis, public attention focused on 
Congress’s and the Federal Reserve’s nontax bailouts, like the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).15 Meanwhile, the IRS fought 
a parallel, but less publicized, battle to ensure that tax property rules 
did not deepen the crisis.16 Astonishingly, the IRS’s responses cost 
more than the much-reviled TARP.17 
 
 10. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5, 67 
(2002) (introducing the concept of “pliability rules”). 
 11. Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1187–92; cf. Henry E. Smith, Ambiguous Quality Changes 
from Taxes and Legal Rules, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 647, 661 (2000) (noting that tax laws “can often 
have the effect of mandating features of a transaction or activity”). 
 12. Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1192–95.  
 13. See infra Part III.C.2.  
 14. Cf. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 143–44 (2011) (discussing how 
unpredictable human-driven events like Russia’s 1998 default on its debt can precipitate financial 
disasters); Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 
490 (2010) (noting that “[e]conomic theories can explain the consequences of panic runs when 
they occur . . . [but] do not explain what triggers them in the first place”).  
 15. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. I., 122 Stat. 3765, 3767.  
 16. For further discussion of the IRS’s responses to the 2008–09 crisis, see infra Part II.  
 17. In fact, TARP has turned a profit for the government. See Paul Kiel & Dan Nguyen, 
Bailout Tracker, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 30, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20170202174559/ 
http://projects.propublica.org/bailout [https://perma.cc/T874-7JB9] (showing profit of $75.8 
billion). Although it is impossible to determine the exact cost of the IRS responses to the financial 
crisis—because tax returns are confidential, see I.R.C. § 6103 (2012)—IRS’ responses were 
enormously expensive. One of the IRS’s bad responses cost the government approximately $22 
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The IRS implicitly recognized the lesson from Ploof that property 
rules should not apply during emergencies because property rules can 
result in the financial equivalent of shipwrecks for taxpayers unable to 
comply. The IRS moved with admirable speed in 2008–09 to waive the 
property rules in tax law that risked worsening the crisis. Examples 
include requirements about mutual fund distributions,18 modifying 
mortgages in mortgage-backed bonds,19 and cash borrowed from 
foreign subsidiaries.20 
But Ploof is only half of the doctrine of necessity. Vincent is the 
other half, replacing the property rules with compensatory liability 
rules during the emergency. In tort law, having Ploof but not Vincent 
would create two fundamental problems. First, boaters would get 
unjust windfalls at dock owners’ expense, and, second, boaters would 
have inefficient incentives to moor at docks even when not necessary.21 
The IRS’s best responses to the 2008–09 crisis incorporated both 
Ploof’s and Vincent’s principles, temporarily replacing property rules 
with liability rules.22 But some of the IRS’s other responses adopted 
Ploof but not Vincent, meaning the IRS did not enforce property rules, 
and yet did not replace them with liability rules.23 These badly crafted 
responses created predictable problems, specifically unjust windfalls 
for some taxpayers, and inefficient incentives for taxpayers to violate 
tax law requirements when it was not truly necessary. After the crisis 
passed and the IRS’s actions finally received scrutiny, these badly 
crafted responses drew vehement criticism from the popular media, tax 
commentators, and Congress.24 
 
billion in lost taxes from Wells Fargo alone. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.3; infra note 237. The IRS’s 
handout to General Motors cost approximately $12 billion, which is more than the $10 billion 
final cost of the company’s TARP bailout. See, e.g., BILL CANIS & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., THE ROLE OF TARP ASSISTANCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL 
MOTORS 13 (2014); infra Part II.B.4.  
 18. See infra Part II.A.1. The IRS also waived a similar requirement applying to real estate 
investments trusts. Infra Part II.A.2.  
 19. See infra Part II.B.5.  
 20. See infra Part II.B.1–2.  
 21. See infra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.  
 22. See infra Part II.A.  
 23. See infra Part II.B. IRS nonenforcement is technically giving the taxpayer the 
entitlement, protected by a property rule. The literature calls this result “Rule 3.” See Calabresi 
& Melamed, supra note 9, at 1116 (introducing “rule three” in tort context).  
 24. See, e.g., American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 
Stat. 115, 342–43 (criticizing and expressly repealing I.R.S. Notice 2008-83); Martin A. Sullivan & 
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Repatriation Aid for the Financial Crisis?, 122 TAX NOTES 7 
(2009); Shamik Trivedi, Media Renews Criticism of Treasury NOL Guidance, 134 TAX NOTES 121 
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Future financial crises are inevitable.25 The history of the U.S. 
economy is replete with financial crises, starting with the crash of 1792, 
which Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton quelled.26 As two 
economists recently observed, “[c]rises cannot be abolished; like 
hurricanes, they can only be managed and mitigated.”27 
This Article details how the IRS can mitigate future financial 
crises by drawing on the rich history of the 2008–09 financial crisis and 
the property-rule and liability-rule frameworks. These lessons are 
timely given the many factors that currently threaten financial crises,28 
such as the eurozone’s possible breakup,29 increasing capital flight from 
 
(2012); Lawrence Zelenak, Can Obama’s IRS Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?, 
122 TAX NOTES 889 (2009); Stephen J. Lubben, For Treasury, a Hidden Cost for Helping G.M., 
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 16, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/for-
treasury-a-hidden-cost-for-helping-g-m/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XVT6-6VU5]; Randall Smith & 
Sharon Terlep, GM Could Be Free of Taxes for Years, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704462704575590642149103202 [https://perma.
cc/8GE3-LHS8]; GM’s Tax Shelter: Another $16 Billion Not Available to Other Car Makers, 
WALL STREET J. (July 31, 2009, 4:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529 
70203609204574314180298525294 [https://perma.cc/W9NY-P495]; Tax Gain Lifts A.I.G. Profit to 
$19.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/business/tax-gain-
lifts-aig-profit-to-19-8-billion.html [https://perma.cc/36BR-G8XL].  
 25. See, e.g., NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS 4 (2011) (“[C]rises 
are the norm, not only in emerging but in advanced industrial economies. Crises . . . have always 
been with us, and with us they will always remain. . . . Crises will figure in our future.”). See 
generally Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., 
Working Paper No. 74, 1992), http://ssrn.com/abstract=161024 [https://perma.cc/QRN9-F9JV] 
(proposing hypothesis as to why crises are a recurring feature of capitalism).  
 26. See Financial Crises: The Slumps That Shaped Modern Finance, ECONOMIST, http:// 
www.economist.com/news/essays/21600451-finance-not-merely-prone-crises-it-shaped-them-
five-historical-crises-show-how-aspects-today-s-fina [https://perma.cc/D7ED-898P]; see also 
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS 
OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 5 (2014) (noting that the United States has had 
fourteen banking crises over the past 180 years); id. at 153–282 (detailing the United States’ 
history of crises). 
 27. ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 25, at 275.  
 28. HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE 
OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 44–45 (2010) (noting that financial crises come regularly); 
Collateral Damage: How Bank Funding May Be Squeezed in the Next Crisis, ECONOMIST (Oct. 
17, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21674776-how-bank-funding 
-may-be-squeezed-next-crisis-collateral-damage [https://perma.cc/RQ9W-FMN5]; We All Hang 
Together: The Crisis of 2023, ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.economist.com/ news/
special-report/21668720-crisis-2023-we-all-hang-together [https://perma.cc/S82B-7RT5] (setting 
out a scenario for a serious financial crisis in 2023).  
 29. See, e.g., The Euro Zone’s Boom Masks Problems That Will Return To Haunt It, 
ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21731822-
mismatch-between-its-economic-and-political-institutions-persists-euro [https://perma.cc/A8M2-
Y8Q8]; France’s Next Revolution: The Vote That Could Wreck the European Union, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21717814-why-french-presidential-
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China,30 various asset bubbles,31 and populist politicians’ threats of 
trade wars.32 
This Article contributes to the broader property-rule and liability-
rule literature by identifying new ways to most effectively use liability 
rules to respond to crises. Because property rules and liability rules 
appear across all areas of law,33 these insights inform fields as diverse 
as constitutional law, patent law, and bankruptcy law. For example, 
bankruptcy law can better prevent types of “bank runs” during 
financial crises by shifting temporarily to liability rules. In the same 
way, constitutional law can better handle quarantines of individuals 
potentially infected with quick-spreading epidemics like Ebola, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),34 and biological weapons. 
Likewise, patent law can better provide access to drugs that might fight 
such epidemics. Globalization increasingly lets epidemics travel widely 
and quickly, making good legal responses essential.35 
Part I discusses the distinction between property rules and liability 
rules, which Professors Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed 
introduced in a pioneering 1972 article.36 This distinction has been 
 
election-will-have-consequences-far-beyond-its-borders-vote [https://perma.cc/M9SE-RPCW] 
(“If [presidential candidate Marine Le Pen] pulls France out of the euro, it would trigger a 
financial crisis . . . .”).  
 30. See, e.g., Carolyn Cui & Juliet Chung, Kyle Bass Steps Up Attack on China’s Currency, 
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kyle-bass-hedge-fund-
estimates-chinas-foreign-reserves-below-critical-level-1455128104 [https://perma.cc/34MX-
ZZGM] (recounting a prominent fund manager’s prediction that China will have difficulty 
weathering a recent “torrent of capital outflows”).  
 31. See, e.g., MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED AND 
HAVE STILL TO LEARN FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 113–90 (2014); Ryan Tracy, Fed Eyes 
Margin Rules To Bolster Oversight, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 10, 2016, 7:12 PM), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/fed-eyes-margin-rules-to-bolster-oversight-1452471174 [https://perma.cc/ 
2YGY-P32E] (“[O]fficials fret about whether they have adequate tools to suppress dangerous 
asset bubbles that could lead to another financial crisis.”).  
 32. See, e.g., America, China and the Risk of a Trade War, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21715656-trade-tensions-will-mount-
destructive-trade-war-can-still-be [https://perma.cc/PBJ2-N9HH].  
 33. See Fennell, supra note 9, at 1404 (noting that law and economics scholars frequently 
address property rules and liability rules).  
 34. SARS caused 8096 cases and 774 deaths in thirty-seven countries over 2002 and 2003. 
See Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness From 1 November 2002 to 31 July 
2003, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/ [https:// 
perma.cc/99E3-DR4Z].  
 35. See Let Us Spray, ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.economist.com/ news/
leaders/21689542-dont-panic-kill-mosquitoes-let-us-spray [https://perma.cc/TH82-3GVG] 
(“[G]lobalisation means that plagues can travel far, wide and terrifyingly fast.”).  
 36. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9 (introducing the distinction between 
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applied to virtually every area of law, ranging from contracts and torts 
to constitutional law and intellectual property.37 Tax law similarly 
features both property rules and liability rules.38 Part I also discusses 
“pliability rules,” where a triggering event—such as a storm, epidemic, 
or financial crisis—causes a property rule to move, temporarily, to a 
liability rule.39 Part I concludes by demonstrating how pliability rules 
are excellent responses to crises in multiple areas of law.40 
Part II surveys the IRS’s major responses to the 2008–09 financial 
crisis, which all embodied Ploof’s insight that crisis-worsening property 
rules should be waived during crises. Some of the IRS’s responses, 
which this article will refer to as the “good responses,” followed 
Vincent as well, and shifted temporarily to liability rules.41 Like tort 
law’s doctrine of necessity, these good responses were economically 
efficient and prevented inequitable enrichment of the affected 
taxpayers. Indeed, this approach worked even better in tax law than in 
tort law, since in tax law it minimized harm to third parties and to the 
overall economy.42 Meanwhile the IRS’s other responses, which this 
article will refer to as the “bad responses,” ignored Vincent and simply 
stopped enforcing property rules in many instances, creating windfalls 
and inefficient incentives for taxpayers.43 The IRS knew that it was 
creating windfalls, and accordingly kept its relief so narrowly tailored 
that many taxpayers got no relief at all, resulting in avoidable 
foreclosures and layoffs. 
 
property rules and liability rules). Calabresi became a U.S. circuit judge in 1994, but remains the 
Sterling Professor Emeritus and Professorial Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. Melamed 
became a Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School in 2015, capping an illustrious 
career practicing law.  
 37. E.g., Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and 
Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993) (applying the property–liability rules distinction 
from Calabresi and Melamed to contract law); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules 
Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) (applying the 
distinction to various areas); Eugene Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The 
Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004) (applying the distinction to constitutional 
law); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 352 (1978) (applying 
the distinction to contract law); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability 
Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (applying the distinction to information 
ownership); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2655 (1994) (applying the distinction to intellectual property).  
 38. See infra Part I.B.  
 39. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 5.  
 40. See infra Part I.C–D.  
 41. See infra Part II.A.  
 42. See infra Parts II.A.1.b, III.A.3.  
 43. See infra Part II.B.  
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Part III draws conclusions, relevant across many areas of law, 
about the best legal responses to crises. Most obviously, moving from 
crisis-worsening property rules to liability rules temporarily during 
crises minimizes harm. Some benefits, like preventing windfalls, 
stopping contagion, and enabling broader-based relief, apply even if 
policymakers craft the temporary liability rule on the fly in response to 
crises. But arranging the temporary liability rules in advance, before 
crises start, can bring even greater benefits, including speedier 
reaction,44 prevention of moral hazard,45 greater transparency,46 more 
flexible private contracts,47 better-designed triggers,48 and proper legal 
authority.49 Part III discusses how these benefits and insights can help 
to address crises across multiple areas of law, including bankruptcy law, 
patent law, and constitutional law. 
I.  PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND PLIABILITY RULES 
This Part begins with an overview of property rules and liability 
rules, those “workhorse concepts that permeate every corner of the 
economic analysis of law.”50 The Part then discusses property rules and 
liability rules in tax law.51 It also considers pliability rules, a powerful 
extension of the property and liability rule concepts.52 
A. Property Rules and Liability Rules 
Calabresi and Melamed’s seminal 1972 article, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,53 
introduced the distinction between property rules and liability rules. 
Scholars have used these concepts to draw insights into areas as diverse 
as torts,54 property,55 contracts,56 intellectual property,57 constitutional 
 
 44. See infra Part III.B.1.  
 45. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 46. See infra Part III.B.3.  
 47. See infra Part III.B.4.  
 48. See infra Part III.B.5.  
 49. See infra Part III.B.6.  
 50. Fennell, supra note 9, at 1404–05.  
 51. See infra Part I.B.  
 52. See infra Parts I.C–I.D.  
 53. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 1089.  
 55. See, e.g., id.; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 715.  
 56. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 37, at 1.  
 57. See, e.g., Lemley & Weiser, supra note 37, at 783; Merges, supra note 37, at 2655. 
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law,58 and tax law.59 
Property rules protect legal entitlements through deterrence.60 
Examples include injunctions, jail time, forcible expulsion, and 
disgorgement of profits.61 By contrast, liability rules protect legal 
entitlements by requiring monetary compensation for violating the 
entitlement.62 
For example, suppose that a factory’s pollution harms neighboring 
residents. A property rule would impose a draconian penalty on the 
factory, such as enjoining further pollution, imprisoning the factory’s 
managers, or ordering disgorgement of all the factory’s profits.63 By 
contrast, a liability rule protecting the residents’ entitlement to clean 
air would require the factory to pay compensatory damages to the 
residents but would let the pollution continue.64 Liability rules set a 
price that compensates residents such that the factory will pollute only 
when it is economically efficient; property rules, in contrast, set a 
penalty so high that the factory should never rationally incur it. 
The term “property rule” is a misnomer. Property rules protect 
many entitlements that are not “property” at all. For example, 
property rules often protect individual liberties under the 
Constitution65 and consumers’ rights to rescind unconscionable 
contracts.66 Individuals often have a property-rule right to force a 
factory to stop polluting, so as to protect their lungs.67  For better or 
worse, Calabresi’s and Melamed’s seminal article coined the term 
“property rule,” and it stuck. A name like “draconian rule” or 
“deterrence rule” would likely be more accurate than “property rule,” 
 
 58.  See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 755.  
 59. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1169.  
 60. Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of 
Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (“Property rules protect entitlements by trying to 
deter others from taking. Liability rules, on the other hand, protect entitlements not by deterring 
but by trying to compensate the victim of nonconsensual takings.”).  
 61. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 13 
(2005). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. at 13. 
 64. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092, 1121; see, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement 
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding permanent damages to residents against a nearby 
cement factory).  
 65. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 758, 771.  
 66. Craswell, supra note 37, at 18. 
 67. See, e.g., Coal. for Clean Air v. VWR Int’l, LLC, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (E.D. Cal. 
2013) (allowing plaintiffs alleging injury from breathing “less pure” air, but no property-related 
injury, to pursue an injunction against polluters). 
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but this Article will use the term “property rule” for consistency with 
the extensive literature. 
Scholars have long debated the relative merits of property and 
liability rules.68 Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell made the 
important observation that property rule and liability rule remedies are 
not two distinct categories, but rather lie along one continuum from 
zero damages to infinitely high damages.69 Liability rules set the 
remedy to compensatory damages, while property-rule remedies set 
the remedy much higher up the continuum, at a level so high as to be 
draconian.70 In other words, property rules and liability rules differ in 
the degree of severity, not in kind. 
B. Tax Law’s Property and Liability Rules 
Tax law uses both property rules and liability rules to protect the 
government’s entitlement to taxpayer compliance with numerous 
requirements.71 In other words, when a taxpayer violates a requirement 
set out in tax law, property rules and liability rules represent the two 
basic approaches for protecting the government’s entitlement to 
compliance with any given requirement. 
For example, the taxpayer’s taxes can increase by an amount that 
compensates the government for the harm that violating the 
requirement caused, such as lost tax revenues.72 This is a liability-rule 
approach.73 Second, the taxpayer can suffer a punitive, 
disproportionate increase in taxes, which is a property-rule approach.74 
Tax requirements for mutual funds illustrate this distinction. 
Mutual funds enable average investors to buy a diversified portfolio of 
 
 68. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 705–06 & n.9 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart 
J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
440, 450–51 (1995) (deeming it a “virtual doctrine” that “[w]hen transaction costs are low, use 
property rules; when transaction costs are high, use liability rules”); Stewart E. Sterk, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296–97 
(2008) (building on the work of Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of 
Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985)). 
 69. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 756–57. 
 70. See id. at 756. Of course, property rules in favor of defendants are the same as zero 
damages; that is, the bottom of the continuum.  
 71. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1187–95.  
 72. See id. at 1192–95.  
 73. See id.  
 74. See id. at 1187–92.  
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investments.75 If a mutual fund meets certain requirements, it qualifies 
for incredibly favorable tax status that allows it to avoid paying 
corporate taxes.76 Some mutual fund requirements are protected by 
property rules and others by liability rules. 
One requirement protected by a property-rule remedy is that a 
mutual fund must distribute at least 90 percent of its income to its 
investors.77 This 90 percent distribution requirement ensures that 
mutual funds are serving their designed purpose of investing on behalf 
of average investors, rather than hoarding cash. If a mutual fund 
distributes only 89 percent of its income, then suddenly all its income 
is subject to the full corporate tax.78 This massive increase in taxes is 
totally out of proportion to the amount by which that fund has failed 
the 90 percent distribution requirement, yet it forces the mutual fund 
to disgorge all the benefits of its previously held favorable tax status. 
As a practical matter, a mutual fund that lost its favorable tax 
status would collapse, and investors would rush to withdraw their 
funds.79 It continues to be true that, as Chief Justice John Marshall 
observed two centuries ago in McCulloch v. Maryland,80 “the power to 
tax involves the power to destroy.”81 
Mutual funds also have requirements protected by liability-rule 
remedies. For example, a mutual fund must earn at least 90 percent of 
its income from interest, dividends, and gains from selling securities.82 
This 90 percent income requirement ensures that mutual funds serve 
 
 75. See I.R.C. § 851(a)(1) (2012); Richard M. Hervey, Taxation of Regulated Investment 
Companies and Their Shareholders, U.S. Income Portfolios (BNA) No. 740-3d, VI.B.  
 76. Specifically, qualifying mutual funds can deduct all dividends paid out to shareholders, 
which entirely, or nearly entirely, relieves the mutual fund of paying corporate taxes. I.R.C. 
§§ 852(b)(1) & (b)(2)(D); Hervey, supra note 75, § VIII.A. The technical term for a mutual fund 
qualifying for the favorable tax status is “regulated investment company” (RIC).  
 77. I.R.C. § 852(a)(1). The specific requirement is paying out 90 percent of its ordinary 
income and 90 percent of its tax-exempt interest. Id. There is no distribution threshold with 
respect to net capital gain. Id. 
 78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.852-1(b) (1962). 
 79. LOIS YUROW, TIMOTHY W. LEVIN, W. JOHN MCGUIRE & JAMES M. STOREY, MUTUAL 
FUND REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK ch. 30 introd., Westlaw (database updated 
Aug. 2017) (“It would create an insurmountable competitive disadvantage to the mutual fund 
vehicle if its investment income were taxed to the fund . . . .”).  
 80. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 81. Id. at 431. 
 82. I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). There are also several closely related types of acceptable income, 
including payments with respect to securities loans, foreign currency gains, and income from 
certain publicly traded partnerships. Id.  
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primarily as investment vehicles.83 Suppose that a mutual fund has an 
unexpectedly stellar return from a nontraditional investment, so that 
only 89 percent of its income qualifies.84 The mutual fund has clearly 
failed the 90 percent income requirement, yet it does not lose its 
favorable tax status. Instead, it must pay the government an excise tax 
of the 1 percent of its income by which it failed the 90 percent income 
requirement.85 This remedy is proportional to the scope of the violation 
and fully compensates the government by turning over all income 
earned in violation of the requirement. The mutual fund retains its 
favorable tax status and does not face collapse on those grounds.86 
In sum, every requirement imposed by tax law is enforced either 
by a draconian property rule or by a compensatory liability rule. 
Property rules do have potential benefits in tax law, including deterring 
taxpayers from hard-to-detect violations and avoiding taxpayer 
gamesmanship.87 But, as we shall see, property rules can bring ruin on 
taxpayers unable to comply due to financial crises swirling around 
them.88 
C. Pliability Rules 
Pliability rules are a straightforward yet powerful extension of the 
property and liability rule concepts, introduced by Professors 
Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky.89 A classic pliability rule 
begins as a property rule and toggles to a liability rule when a triggering 
event occurs.90 
Pliability rules appear across many areas of law; for example, in 
property law, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment creates a 
pliability rule.91 Landowners generally have a property-rule right to 
exclude others. But if the land is needed for “public use,” which is the 
 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1192, at 10–11 (1976).  
 84. For example, the mutual fund might own substantial debt secured by real estate. If the 
debt defaulted, foreclosure might result in the mutual fund owning real estate. Neither rental 
income nor gains from selling property qualify towards the 90 percent requirement. See Hervey, 
supra note 75, § V.J.  
 85. See I.R.C. § 851(i)(2). To be precise, the additional tax is ((100% – 89%) – (1/9 × 89%)). 
Id.  
 86. See YUROW ET AL., supra note 79, at ch. 30 introd.  
 87. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1213–17.  
 88. See infra Part II.A.1.  
 89. See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10 (introducing pliability rules).  
 90. Id. at 5, 65. The term “pliability” comes from adding the “p” from property to “liability.” 
See id. at 5. 
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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triggering event, then the government can take the land in exchange 
for “just compensation,” a liability rule.92 
In corporate law, a shareholder’s entitlement to shares is 
protected by a pliability rule.93 Normally shareholders have a property-
rule right in their shares and cannot be forced to sell their shares. But 
during mergers, an acquiring corporation can force some shareholders 
of the acquired corporation to sell their shares for a court-appraised 
price,94 which is a liability rule.95 
The doctrine of necessity discussed earlier is a pliability rule. In 
normal times, dock owners have property-rule protection for their 
docks.96 A boater that moors without the dock owner’s permission 
faces severe remedies such as jail time, punitive damages, or forcible 
expulsion.97 But necessity, such as a dangerous storm, triggers a shift to 
a liability rule. A boater seeking shelter is entitled to temporarily use 
the dock, per Ploof, but must compensate the dock owner for any 
resulting damages, per Vincent. This pliability rule promotes both 
efficiency and equity. 
Efficiency is served because the pliability rule minimizes total 
damage from the storm.98 Two types of damage are possible—harm to 
the dock and harm to the boat, which includes harm to individuals 
onboard. If the expected harm to the boat from not docking exceeds 
the expected harm to the dock, the boater will rationally dock. But if 
the expected harm to the dock from docking exceeds the expected 
harm from not docking, the boater will, rationally, not dock. 
Equity is also well served, as neither boaters nor dock owners 
receive windfalls. The boater gets docking rights, but must pay 
compensation to make the dock owner whole. This compensation 
means that the doctrine of necessity is in no way a bailout for boaters. 
Even if a policy serves both efficiency and equity, one must also 
 
 92. Id.; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 59–60.  
 93. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 32–34. 
 94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2016) (describing appraisal rights).  
 95. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 32–34. 
 96. Id. at 51 n.180.  
 97. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(m), (o) (2016); Hillhouse v. Creedon, 169 S.W.3d 599, 
602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (providing for an injunction against a boat owner); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (providing the general rule that “[a]n actor is 
privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, 
to prevent or terminate another’s intrusion upon the actor’s land or chattels”). 
 98. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 225 (8th ed. 2011). When this 
Article refers to “efficiency,” it refers to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, maximizing total social welfare 
of all involved parties.  
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consider whether the policy creates moral hazard, which refers to “any 
situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk 
to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly.”99 For 
example, a homeowner with fire insurance may take less care to reduce 
the risk of fire, knowing that the insurance company will cover losses 
from any fire.100 By contrast, with the doctrine of necessity, the boater 
decides how much risk to take by deciding whether to go sailing, and 
also bears the cost if things go badly, as the boater must compensate 
the dock owner under the liability rule established by Vincent. As a 
result, the doctrine of necessity does not create moral hazard. 
One oft-mentioned benefit of property rules is that the parties can 
negotiate over the entitlement.101 In a theoretical world with zero 
transaction costs, perfect information, and no strategic bargaining, tort 
law could keep its property-rule protection for dock owners even 
during storms. As the storm raged, dock owners and boaters could 
negotiate the optimal solution to boat docking and price. 
But this theoretical world obviously does not exist. During 
negotiations the boat would probably wreck, which is inefficient. Even 
if negotiations succeeded, the result would likely be extortionate 
docking fees, which is inequitable. Temporarily shifting to liability 
rules better serves both equity and efficiency.102Academics vehemently 
debate the relative merits of property rules versus liability rules.103 But 
there is consensus that tort law’s temporary switch to liability rules in 
times of necessity is desirable.104 Liability rules make more sense than 
property rules when negotiation is unlikely to produce an efficient and 
equitable result.105 
 
 99. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS 63 (2009); accord 
ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 25, at 68; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The 
Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4, 6 (1983) (arguing that moral 
hazard is the result of three factors, specifically risk, imperfect information, and “insurance,” 
which covers a wide array of arrangements shifting risk from one party to another). See generally 
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).  
 100. KRUGMAN, supra note 99, at 62–63.  
 101. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106 (“Why cannot a society simply . . . let its 
transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation? Why, in other words, cannot society limit 
itself to the property rule?”).  
 102. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2092 (1997).  
 103. AYRES, supra note 61, at 183–200 (surveying the debate about property rules versus 
liability rules).  
 104. Epstein, supra note 102, at 2108 (arguing strongly for the superiority of property rules, 
but conceding that the doctrine of necessity’s temporary liability rules make sense).  
 105. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106 (“Often the cost of establishing the value of 
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In general, switches from property rules to liability rules—that is, 
pliability rules—make the most sense under three conditions.106 First 
and most importantly, pliability rules handle substantially changed 
circumstances,107 and make excellent responses to storms, quick-
spreading disease epidemics, and financial crises, all of which create 
massively altered circumstances. Second, pliability rules can best 
balance competing interests, including efficiency and fairness.108 Third, 
pliability rules can serve a social goal, like efficiency, better than either 
a pure property rule or a pure liability rule could.109 All three of these 
considerations often weigh in favor of using pliability rules as responses 
to storms, epidemics, and financial crises. 
D. Pliability Rules: Fighting Epidemics and Financial Crises 
Classic pliability rules, which temporarily move from property 
rules to liability rules, are ideal for fighting crises in tax law and other 
areas. Classic pliability rules have many advantages over the all-too-
common approach of moving from property rules to temporary 
nonenforcement.110 The doctrine of necessity is one example, and Parts 
II and III of this Article illustrate in depth why classic pliability rules 
make sense in tax law. But pliability rules make sense for responding 
to crises in many other areas of law, and a brief application of pliability 
rules to constitutional law, bankruptcy law, and patent law shows the 
desirability of pliability rules for crises in general, as a preview for a 
more in-depth discussion related to tax law. 
Constitutional law is the only area of law, other than tort law, 
where scholars have investigated the use of pliability rules for 
responding to crises.111 Constitutional law should respond to fast-
 
an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement 
would benefit all concerned, such a transfer will not occur.”).  
 106. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 66.  
 107. Id. at 67.  
 108. Id. at 67–68.  
 109. Id. at 68–69.  
 110. Bell and Parchomovsky term such moves from property rules to nonenforcement as 
“zero order pliability rule[s].” Id. at 6, 30–31. This Article will simply refer to such moves as moves 
to nonenforcement to keep the terminology simple. Furthermore, Bell and Parchomovsky would 
use the term “multiple stage pliability rule” to describe the pliability rules that this Article 
advocates—starting with a property rule, moving temporarily to a liability rule during a crisis, and 
then returning to the original property rule after the crisis. Id. at 59 (discussing multiple stage 
pliability rules). This Article will simply use the term “pliability rule” without the preceding words 
“multiple stage.”  
 111. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 37 (applying pliability rules to constitutional law’s 
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spreading epidemics like Ebola and SARS with a pliability rule.112 
Individuals are entitled to certain liberty interests113 that are generally 
protected by property rules, with injunctions and jail time for those 
who attempt to take away the entitlement.114 But this property rule 
makes little sense during an epidemic, because quarantining infected 
or likely infected individuals—that is, taking their liberty—prevents 
greater social harm. For that reason, courts allow involuntary 
quarantines, without any compensation to those quarantined.115 In 
doing so, courts faced with quarantines take the lesson of Ploof, and do 
not enforce property rules during crises, but they ignore the lesson of 
Vincent, to replace the property rule with a compensatory liability rule. 
Instead, constitutional law should use a pliability rule for fast-
spreading epidemics, permitting quarantines but requiring 
compensation to those quarantined for their loss of liberty. Other 
countries have used this approach; for example, both Taiwan and 
Canada compensated individuals who were quarantined during the 
2003 SARS outbreak.116 
Just as constitutional law should respond with pliability rules for 
epidemic crises, bankruptcy law should respond to financial crises with 
pliability rules for the treatment of repurchase agreements, which are 
often called “repos” for short, and which are a type of financial contract 
 
handling of national security emergencies).  
 112. See generally id. (proposing using pliability rules to protect constitutional rights in 
general, including in cases of mass detentions of people thought to be national security threats).  
 113. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.  
 114. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (describing the crime of 
false imprisonment).  
 115. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 825 (“When an epidemic looms, the relevant individual 
rights receive no protection at all.”); e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) 
(recognizing the “authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every 
description’”).  
 116. Colin Perkel, SARS Patients Compensated, HAMILTON OBSERVER (Ont., Can.), June 14, 
2003, at D1 (reporting Ontario’s payment of up to six thousand dollars in compensation to 
quarantined persons); Richard Harris, Quarantine Effectiveness Under Scrutiny, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (Oct. 14, 2003) (noting that Taiwan paid quarantined persons a total of $17 million), 
http://www.npr.org/programs/all-things-considered/2003/10/14/13063432/ [https://perma.cc/JH22-
A7C5].  
U.S. courts could arguably implement a temporary liability rule for quarantines, without 
any further legislative action, by interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) as requiring compensation 
for those who are quarantined. Such judicial action would first require lifting the qualified 
immunity that currently applies to government officials ordering quarantines. See Hickox v. 
Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588–603 (D.N.J., 2016) (dismissing a nurse’s § 1983 claims for 
involuntary quarantine for want of violation of clearly established law). 
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that contributed to the 2008–09 financial crisis.117 Repos are a form of 
secured borrowing commonly used between financial institutions, 
using securities like mortgage-backed bonds as collateral.118 If the 
debtor goes bankrupt, bankruptcy law lets the creditor immediately 
seize and sell the collateral, without the debtor receiving the 
protections normally given by bankruptcy law.119 The creditor thus has 
property-rule protection. This rule may make sense during normal 
times.120 But during financial crises, this property rule encourages and 
enables “banks runs” on the debtor, as illustrated by the key role the 
property rule played in the destruction of Lehman Brothers, which had 
borrowed heavily using repos.121 Worse, creditors sell the seized 
collateral—for example, mortgage-backed bonds—thus depressing the 
market for those securities further and worsening the crisis.122 
 
 117. Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe & Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe 
Harbors, 69 BUS. LAW. 1015, 1015 (2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: 
Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 716.  
 118. As described by the Third Circuit: 
A standard repurchase agreement, commonly called a “repo,” consists of a two-part 
transaction. The first part is the transfer of specified securities by one party, the dealer, 
to another party, the purchaser, in exchange for cash. The second part consists of a 
contemporaneous agreement by the dealer to repurchase the securities at the original 
price, plus an agreed upon additional amount on a specified future date. 
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer S&L Ass’n, 878 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 
1989). This additional amount added to the price is the interest on the loan, and the securities are 
the collateral for the loan. See Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275, 
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); accord Nebraska Dept. of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513 U.S. 123, 125 (1994). 
Regarding the use of repos involving mortgage-backed securities as collateral, see Morrison et al., 
supra note 117, at 1015, 1017.  
 119. 11 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) (“[E]xercise of a contractual right of a repo participant or financial 
participant to cause the liquidation, termination, or acceleration of a repurchase agreement . . . 
shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited.”); see also id. § 362(b)(7), (o) (exempting repos 
from bankruptcy’s automatic stay); id. § 546(f) (“the trustee may not avoid a transfer made by or 
to (or for the benefit of) a repo participant”); id. § 548(d)(2)(C) (deeming that “a repo 
participant . . . that receives a margin payment . . . or settlement payment . . . in connection with 
a repurchase agreement, takes for value to the extent of such payment,” thus preventing repo 
counterparties from being attacked under the fraudulent conveyance provisions).  
 120. Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; 
Treatment of Derivatives, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial 
& Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4 (2014) (statement of Seth 
Grosshandler).  
 121. Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1040–41; Schwarcz, supra note 117, at 716 (stating that 
bankruptcy law rules on repos “explain the run on Lehman Brothers” at least in part).  
 122. See Brian Begalle, Antoine Martin, James McAndrews & Susan McLaughlin, The Risk 
of Fire Sales in the Tri-Party Repo Market (2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
staff_reports/sr616.html [https://perma.cc/RMV4-4WWS]; Gaetano Antinolfi et al., Repos, Fire 
Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2012-15, 2012), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189583 [https://perma.cc/YN2T-X9R7]; Sebastian Infante, Repo 
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Instead, during financial crises, the property-rule protection for 
repo creditors should be turned into a liability rule. Creditors should 
receive compensation based on the fair market value of the 
collateral,123 plus a pro rata recovery from the debtor’s estate in 
proportion to the loan amount not covered by the collateral’s value.124 
This pliability rule would preserve the property-rule protection for 
repo creditors during normal times, but it would allow for a move to 
liability-rule protection to prevent bank runs during financial crises. 
Unlike constitutional law and bankruptcy law, patent law has 
already developed a rudimentary pliability rule for responding to 
crises. Specifically, patent law has a pliability rule that can handle crises 
like quick-spreading epidemics or bioterrorism that can be battled with 
patented drugs. Patent holders often receive property-rule protection 
in the form of an injunction against anyone infringing on their patent.125 
But this protection becomes a liability rule in the form of compensatory 
damages from infringers under certain circumstances, including when 
such a switch would serve “the public interest.”126 Permitting 
competitors to manufacture generic versions of patented drugs, with 
compensation due to the patent holder, fully mobilizes society’s 
resources to combat the epidemic or the bioterrorism—an excellent 
result.127 This Article will draw lessons from the IRS’s responses to the 
2008–09 financial crisis to propose concrete steps to further improve 
 
Collateral Fire Sales: The Effects of Exemption from the Automatic Stay (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & 
Econ. Discussion Series No. 2013-83, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/ 
201383/201383pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHS5-P324].  
 123. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (“An allowed claim . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value 
of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . .”).  
 124. Id. (“[U]nsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is less 
than the amount of such allowed claim.”); see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 506.03 (16th ed. 
2016). This liability rule is simply the default in bankruptcy law, once the special treatment for 
repos is turned off.  
 125. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting that an injunction 
will protect a patent under traditional principles of equity); id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(“From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of 
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases.”).  
 126. Id. at 391 (majority opinion). The Court also provided three other conditions, not 
generally relevant to epidemics and bioterrorism, that may move protection from an injunction 
to compensatory damages. Id. 
 127. See David B. Resnik & Kenneth A. De Ville, Bioterrorism and Patent Rights: 
“Compulsory Licensure” and the Case of Cipro, 2 AM. J. BIOETH. 29, 32 (2002). The compulsory 
licensing should include allowing imports of generic versions manufactured abroad, taking 
advantage of worldwide capacity. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (providing that “import[ing] into 
the United States any patented invention” is patent infringement).  
BLAIR-STANEK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2018  10:42 PM 
1174  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1155 
this pliability rule in patent law.128 
II.  THE IRS’S RESPONSES TO THE 2008–09 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
This Part examines the IRS’s major responses to the 2008–09 
financial crisis.129 First it considers the good responses, which moved 
temporarily from property rules to liability rules.130 It goes into depth 
analyzing one of the IRS’s good responses, involving mutual funds, to 
demonstrate how moving to liability rules during crises has benefits 
very similar to the doctrine of necessity.131 Indeed, in tax law such 
moves have even greater benefits, including minimizing harm to third 
parties and to the entire economy.132 This Part then considers the IRS’s 
bad responses,133 which moved from property rules to nonenforcement, 
thereby giving affected taxpayers windfalls and encouraging 
unnecessary violations. 
A. Good Responses: Temporary Moves from Property Rules to 
Liability Rules 
This Section discusses those instances when the IRS responded to 
 
 128. See infra Parts III.B.1, 4–6. 
 129. This Article does not discuss the IRS’s responses to the 2008–09 financial crisis that 
merely clarified existing law or minimized procedural difficulties. E.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-27, 
2008-1 C.B. 543 (minimizing procedural difficulties in resolving auction-rate securities 
difficulties); I.R.S. Notice 2008-41, 2008-1 C.B. 742 (same); I.R.S. Notice 2008-88, 2008-42 I.R.B. 
933 (same); I.R.S. Notice 2008-55, 2008-27 I.R.B. 11 (clarifying classification as debt in specific 
instance); I.R.S. Notice 2008-78, 2008-41 I.R.B. 851 (clarifying that responding to an unforeseen 
crisis was not part of a “plan”); Rev. Proc. 2008-58, 2008-41 I.R.B. 856 (clarifying tax treatment 
of certain securities-litigation settlements); Rev. Proc. 2009-10, 2009-2 I.R.B. 267 (clarifying tax 
treatment of money market mutual fund sponsors’ payments to shore up funds); Rev. Proc. 2009-
42, 2009-40 I.R.B. 459 (clarifying classification of mutual fund investments in bailout-related 
vehicles). This Part also does not discuss IRS responses that were rendered irrelevant by 
Congress, such as the IRS’s initial response to suspend the applicable high yield discount 
obligation (AHYDO) rules that deny or delay deductions on certain debt instruments. Rev. Proc. 
2008-51, 2008-35 I.R.B. 562 (rendered irrelevant by Pub. L. No. 111-5 §1232(c)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 
341 (Feb. 17, 2009) (currently codified at I.R.C. § 163(e)(5)(F)(iii), (i)(1) (2012))); cf. NEW YORK 
STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE AHYDO RULES OF SECTIONS 163(E)(5) AND 163(I) at 5-6 
(Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter AHYDO REPORT], https://www.stradley.com/~/media/Files/ 
Publications/2017/03/NYSBA-AHYDO.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDW4-F67C] (providing 
background about AHYDO rules); id. at 7 (discussing Congress’s enactment of I.R.C. 
§ 163(e)(5)(F)(iii) & (i)(1)). This Part also does not discuss IRS actions during the 2008–09 
financial crisis that apply permanently. E.g., Rev. Proc. 2008-63, 2008-42 I.R.B. 946 (interpreting 
how I.R.C. § 1058 applies when the taxpayer’s counterparty goes bankrupt).  
 130. See infra Part II.A.  
 131. See infra Part II.A.1.  
 132. See infra Part II.A.1.b.  
 133. See infra Part II.B.  
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the financial crisis by shifting from a property rule to a liability rule, 
temporarily. These responses employed the wisdom of both Ploof and 
Vincent, albeit without the IRS acknowledging that it was taking an 
approach perfected long ago in tort law. This Section begins with an in-
depth analysis of the IRS’s response to mutual fund distress. 
1. Mutual Funds.  Many date the start of the financial crisis to the 
freezing of three mutual funds, run by the bank BNP Paribas, that 
invested largely in subprime mortgage assets.134 Another pivotal 
moment in the crisis came when the Reserve Primary mutual fund 
announced substantial losses, after which “the dominoes started 
falling.”135 Happily, the IRS’s ad hoc response to the tax problems 
faced by troubled mutual funds mirrored the doctrine of necessity. 
Recall that tax law requires mutual funds to distribute to their 
investors at least 90 percent of their income each year,136 and that this 
requirement is protected by a harsh property rule. In normal times, this 
90 percent distribution requirement poses no problem. Many common 
investment strategies cause mutual funds to recognize income on their 
tax returns years before they actually receive cash.137 For example, 
suppose that a mutual fund purchases a bond issued for $900 that 
promises to repay $1000 at the bond’s maturity date. For each year 
before the bond’s maturity date, the mutual fund must include a 
portion of that $100 original issue discount as income, even though the 
mutual fund receives none of that $100 in cash.138 Mutual funds using 
these investment strategies can simply borrow cash to distribute to 
shareholders to meet the 90 percent threshold.139 
 
 134. See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE 
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 90 (2014); Gregory Zuckerman, James R. Hagerty & David 
Gauthier-Villars, Impact of Mortgage Crisis Spreads, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 10, 2007), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118664884606092848 [http://perma.cc/ZGB6-S29N] (“The first 
jolt came from French bank BNP Paribas . . . .”).  
 135. BLINDER, supra note 134, at 143.  
 136. I.R.C. § 852(a)(1) (2012).  
 137. Hervey, supra note 75, § VII.B (discussing “situations where [a mutual fund’s] cash flow 
is less than taxable income”).  
 138. I.R.C. §§ 1272, 1273 (governing original issue discount); see BORIS I. BITTKER & 
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 53.3 (1999 & 
Supp. 2016) (providing a full overview of original issue discount); see also Hervey, supra note 75, 
§ VII.B (noting that “original issue discount” can cause cash flow to be less than taxable income); 
id. (noting that “[g]ains from futures contracts or options that are marked-to-market under §1256” 
can also cause cash flow to be less than taxable income).  
 139. Hervey, supra note 75, § VII.B (noting that mutual funds “may have to sell assets or 
borrow money in order to satisfy the requirement”).  
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But the financial crisis created a cash crunch, making it extremely 
difficult for mutual funds using such strategies to borrow money.140 As 
a result, many mutual funds faced the prospect of failing the 90 percent 
distribution requirement, which would have imperiled their existence. 
The IRS came up with an ingenious response, temporarily turning 
this property rule into a liability rule. The IRS promulgated guidance141 
providing that if mutual funds distributed newly minted mutual fund 
shares and a de minimis amount of cash,142 the newly minted shares 
would count towards the 90 percent threshold.143 In effect, mutual 
funds were allowed to conjure up paper distributions as needed to 
avoid running afoul of the 90 percent distribution requirement. This 
liability rule came with an explicit end date.144 
The IRS thus created a temporary liability rule, because the newly 
minted mutual fund shares created taxable income for investors in such 
mutual funds.145 The IRS received additional tax proportional to the 
amount by which a mutual fund fell below the 90 percent requirement, 
fully compensating the government. 
The IRS’s response kept any mutual fund from losing its favorable 
tax status during the financial crisis.146 And because investors did not 
fear such devastating status losses, the IRS helped maintain investor 
confidence in mutual funds.147 
 
 140. All You Need Is Cash, ECONOMIST (Nov. 20, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
12637043 [https://perma.cc/U8DY-EL2Q].  
 141. Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356, amplified and extended by Rev. Proc. 2010-12, 
2010-3 I.R.B. 302 (extending this relief until Dec. 31, 2011).  
 142. Id. § 3(4) (requiring that actual cash be only 10 percent of the distributions deemed as 
being paid).  
 143. See id. (relying on creative interpretations of I.R.C. § 305(b)(1) (2006) and Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.305-2(a), 1.305-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1973)).  
 144. Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356 § 3.3 (applying to distributions “declared with 
respect to a taxable year ending on or before December 31, 2009”). The IRS extended this relief 
with Rev. Proc. 2010-12, 2010-3 I.R.B. 302 (extending relief until Dec. 31, 2011). 
 145. I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (including dividends in gross income); Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(a) (as 
amended in 1973); Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356 §§ 2.03–.04. Although this liability rule 
lapsed at the end of 2011, the IRS in 2017 reintroduced this liability rule, making it permanent, 
albeit with requirement of paying at least 20 percent of the dividend in cash. Rev. Proc. 2017-45, 
2017-35 I.R.B. 216; see Matthew R. Madara, IRS Issues Guidance on Stock Distributions by REITs 
and RICs, 156 TAX NOTES 921 (Aug. 21, 2017) (discussing the permanent ruling and how its 
temporary predecessors had helped during the financial crisis).  
 146. A search of the SEC’s EDGAR database reveals no reports of any fund losing its tax 
status.  
 147. While the federal government provided guarantees for a single category of mutual 
funds—money market funds—it did not provide guarantees for other types of mutual funds, such 
as stock mutual funds or bond mutual funds. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
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a. Minimizing Total Harm to Mutual Funds and Government.  The 
doctrine of necessity minimizes total harm to boaters and dock owners 
from storms. In the same way, the IRS’s actions minimized total harm 
from the financial crisis to the government, which is entitled to 
taxpayer compliance, and to mutual funds, many of which could not 
comply during the financial storm. 
The harm to the government from a taxpayer violating a 
requirement is best understood as the erosion of the relevant tax base. 
The government relies on the existence of a corporate tax base on 
which to levy the corporate tax.148 Absent the special favorable tax 
provisions applicable to mutual funds, they would be included in that 
base and properly taxed as corporations.149 The tax requirements 
imposed on mutual funds, including the 90 percent distribution 
requirement, exist to safeguard the government’s corporate tax base 
by ensuring that mutual funds do not act like corporations carrying on 
active businesses. Thus, when a mutual fund distributes less than the 
required 90 percent, the corporate tax base is eroded, harming tax 
revenue. The IRS’s crisis response created a liability rule that 
compensated the government for the erosion to the corporate tax base 
resulting from mutual funds not meeting the distribution requirements. 
The harm to a mutual fund from losing its favorable tax status 
would be immediate and severe—a “genuine disaster,” as one treatise 
puts it.150 A mutual fund subject to full corporate taxation would 
become an uneconomical investment vehicle,151 and investors would 
rush to withdraw their money.152 
Just as the doctrine of necessity creates incentives for boaters to 
minimize the total damage caused by storms, the IRS’s move created 
incentives for mutual funds to minimize the total damage caused by the 
financial crisis. To the extent that a mutual fund lacked readily 
 
Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx [https://perma.cc/5GF2-
98DD]. 
 148. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OVERVIEW 
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 9–11 (2014).  
 149. Compare I.R.C. § 851(a) (2012) (requiring that mutual funds receiving the favorable tax 
status be a “domestic corporation”), with id. § 11 (imposing corporate tax on corporations).  
 150. YUROW ET AL., supra note 79, at ch. 30 intro.  
 151. Id. (“It would create an insurmountable competitive disadvantage to the mutual fund 
vehicle if its investment income were taxed to the fund.”).  
 152. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee 
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 102–05 (2010) (providing an overview 
of exit from mutual funds, also called open-ended investment funds). 
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available cash to meet the 90 percent distribution requirement, the 
fund’s investors had to pay additional tax to compensate the 
government for the shortfall.153 Mutual funds had an incentive to use 
this mechanism only to the extent that they genuinely needed it, 
because its investors would not tolerate more taxation than absolutely 
necessary. 
Recall that the doctrine of necessity does not create moral hazard, 
because boaters must pay compensation for any damage they cause by 
taking advantage of the ability to dock.154 Similarly, the IRS’s move did 
not create moral hazard, because a mutual fund’s investors had to 
compensate the government to the extent that the mutual fund failed 
the 90 percent distribution requirement. 
b. Minimizing Financial Contagion.  Moving tax law’s property 
rules to liability rules temporarily during financial crises can have even 
greater benefits than tort law’s similar shifts in response to storms. In 
torts, the doctrine of necessity minimizes total harm to two parties, 
such as the dock owner and the boater. In tax, a move to liability rules 
during crises not only minimizes harm to the affected taxpayer and the 
government, but also minimizes harm to third parties and the economy 
as a whole. The interconnectedness of financial markets, financial 
institutions like banks and mutual funds, and the broader economy 
means that one institution’s distress can spread to others, a 
phenomenon known as “financial contagion” by analogy to disease 
epidemics.155 
If the 90 percent distribution requirement had remained protected 
by a property rule during the 2008–09 financial crisis, mutual funds 
would have been forced to sell assets, either to scrounge up sufficient 
cash to make the required distribution, or to liquidate after losing the 
favorable tax status.156 Selling troubled assets during a financial crisis 
increases supply and further depresses prices, and such “fire sales” 
clearly worsen crises by also harming third parties who hold similar 
 
 153. See supra note 143. 
 154. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 155. OECD, FINANCIAL CONTAGION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZED BANKING 3 (2012), 
https://www.oecd.org/eco/monetary/50556019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFT-VUFL]; David K. 
Suska, Reappraising Dodd-Frank’s Living Will Regime, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 779, 800 
(2016).  
 156. For an explanation of the harms due to losing favorable tax status, see supra notes 150–
51.  
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assets.157 Such fire sales are a key mechanism for financial contagion.158  
The IRS’s temporary liability rule prevented tax-driven fire sales and 
thus helped fight the crisis. 
The temporary liability rule’s benefits likely extended well beyond 
holders of distressed assets. For example, an individual who directly 
owned the same stocks as a mutual fund—stocks that did not fall as 
much in price as they might have if the mutual fund had been forced to 
liquidate those assets in a fire sale—might have felt wealthier and thus 
been more willing to buy roses at a local florist. The florist would thus 
have been less likely to lay off workers.159 
As another example, if a mutual fund had lost its favorable tax 
status because the IRS had maintained the property-rule regime, the 
mutual fund would likely have become insolvent, creating losses for 
any banks from which the mutual fund had borrowed.160 Such losses 
would in turn make those banks more likely to default on their own 
obligations, and so on, spreading the contagion throughout the 
financial system.161 
In short, shifting temporarily from property rules to liability rules 
not only resulted in the most efficient resolution between the taxpayer 
and the government, but also prevented contagion from spreading to 
third parties and the broader economy. 
c. Preventing Windfalls.  Recall that the doctrine of necessity is not 
only efficient, but also equitable, because it prevents the undue 
enrichment of dock owners and boaters alike.162 Tax law shifting to 
liability rules during crises produces this same benefit. Liability rules 
require the violating party to compensate the violated party. The 
boater must compensate the dock owner for storm damage, and the 
taxpayer must compensate the government for violating tax law 
requirements during financial crises. For example, shifting the mutual 
fund 90 percent distribution requirement to a liability rule required 
 
 157. See Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1030–31 (discussing a growing body of evidence 
showing how fire sales of assets can be a vector of financial contagion). For further discussion of 
economists’ work on the topic, see supra note 122.  
 158. Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1030–31.  
 159. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 14, at 490 (discussing the myriad, complex ways financial 
contagion spreads to the real economy).  
 160. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (2012) (allowing mutual funds to borrow from banks); 
YUROW ET AL., supra note 79, § 13:2 (discussing mutual funds’ ability to take on embedded 
leverage, including through certain investment transactions).  
 161. See Morrison et al., supra note 117, at 1030 (calling this “old-school contagion”).  
 162. See supra Part I.C.  
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compensation to the government proportional to how far the taxpayer 
fell below the threshold.163 In short, shifting a requirement from a 
property rule to a liability rule is in no way a bailout for the taxpayer. 
d. Infeasibility of Negotiation.  Another oft-mentioned 
justification for property rules is that parties can simply negotiate an 
alternative, optimal solution on their own.164 In tax law, the IRS and a 
taxpayer can negotiate over the amount the taxpayer pays for violating 
a requirement.165 But relying on the ability to negotiate around 
property rules during emergencies has obvious limitations. Consider, 
for instance, the implausibility of a dock owner and a boater 
negotiating a docking arrangement as a storm rages.166 It is similarly 
implausible to expect the IRS and taxpayers to negotiate efficient and 
equitable solutions as a financial crisis rages. 
Speedy responses are essential in fighting financial crises,167 but 
the IRS moves slowly to negotiate settlements with taxpayers.168 
During a crisis, the IRS cannot feasibly negotiate with each and every 
taxpayer who violates a requirement—certainly not in time to avoid 
serious harm to the taxpayers themselves, third parties, and the 
broader economy. Sticking to the property rule and relying on IRS–
taxpayer negotiation is implausible and would cause unnecessary 
harm. In short, relying on negotiation would be economically 
inefficient. 
Even if the IRS could work with unprecedented speed and 
 
 163. For an explanation of the IRS’s temporary liability rule, see supra notes 143–45 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1106 (“Why cannot a society simply . . . let its 
transfer occur only through a voluntary negotiation? Why, in other words, cannot society limit 
itself to the property rule?”). 
 165. Many such mechanisms exist. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 9.01 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining that the IRS’s appeals office 
“receives well over one hundred thousand cases each year. Appeals officers negotiate and settle 
85 to 90 percent of the cases with taxpayers”); id. ¶¶ 9.07–.09; see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7121, 7122; cf. 
Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax Law’s Offer-in-
Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (2012) (discussing the current state of 
taxpayer–IRS compromise); Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance 
and the Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 425 (2012) (analyzing the wider 
effect of compromises and nonenforcement by the IRS).  
 166. See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.  
 167. PAULSON, supra note 28, at 244 (“[O]ur actions had to be decisive and overwhelming.”); 
id. at 362 (“A financial institution could go under immediately if it lost the confidence of creditors 
and clients.”); ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 25, at 112–13.  
 168. See SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 165, ¶ 9.07 (giving overview of procedure).  
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negotiate sufficiently prompt settlements with all affected taxpayers 
during financial crises, the settlements would still vary widely based on 
any given taxpayer’s luck and negotiating skill.169 Similarly situated 
taxpayers would be treated differently, violating the tax law goal of 
horizontal equity.170 
In short, keeping property rules during financial crises and relying 
on IRS–taxpayer negotiations would be worse for both efficiency and 
equity than adopting a temporary liability rule. 
2. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).  Another good IRS 
response to the 2008–09 financial crisis involved real estate investment 
trusts (REITs). REITs enable average investors to buy into a 
professionally managed, diversified real estate portfolio.171 While 
mutual funds invest in stocks, bonds, and other securities, REITs invest 
in real estate assets. In 2016, the 224 REITs traded on U.S. stock 
markets had a total market capitalization of slightly over $1 trillion.172 
REITs own a wide variety of real estate assets ranging from 
warehouses and skyscrapers to mortgages and apartment buildings.173 
REITs, like mutual funds, receive very favorable tax treatment, 
provided that they meet certain requirements. 
Just as mutual funds must distribute at least 90 percent of their 
income to investors to retain favorable tax status, so must REITs 
distribute at least 90 percent of their income to shareholders.174 As with 
mutual funds, this requirement is protected by a property rule, 
meaning REITs stand to lose their favorable tax status if they fail this 
requirement. As with mutual funds, the financial crisis and its cash 
crunch left many REITs unable to meet this requirement.175 
 
 169. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1212–13 (“Different taxpayers will have different IRS 
employees handling their cases. Some IRS employees will be much better negotiators than others, 
capturing much different portions of the wide negotiating range between $0 and status-loss.”).  
 170. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 3.1.4 (discussing horizontal equity).  
 171. H.R. REP. NO. 86-2020, at 3–4 (1960).  
 172. FTSE Nareit Real Estate Index Historical Market Capitalization, 1972, 2016, NAREIT, 
https://www.reit.com/investing/industry-data-research/us-reit-industry-equity-market-cap 
[https://perma.cc/5W6T-LYG2].  
 173. Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, Frequently Asked Questions About REITs, 
NAREIT 2 (2011), http://www.reit.com/portals/0/PDF/2011FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WBQ-
EGHK].  
 174. I.R.C. § 857(a)(1) (2012).  
 175. See D. Brock Griffiths, Guidance May Help REITs Conserve Cash, 36 REAL ESTATE 
TAX’N 93, 93 (2009); id. at 96; Letter of Steven Wechsler, Nat’l Ass’n of Real Estate Inv. Trusts, 
to Eric Solomon, Treasury Assistant Sec’y for Tax Policy (Oct. 31, 2008), reprinted in 2008 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 221–33.  
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The IRS responded by turning the property rule into a temporary 
liability rule by permitting REITs to create paper dividends that were 
taxable to shareholders but that counted towards the 90 percent 
distribution requirement.176 As with mutual funds, the IRS’s actions 
kept tax law from worsening the 2008–09 financial crisis for REITs, 
while the tax imposed on a REIT’s shareholders on the paper dividends 
prevented abuse or windfalls.177 
3. Variable Annuities.  Another good IRS response pertained to 
annuities, which are an important retirement tool that gives retirees 
periodic payments until death.178 Variable-contract annuities are a type 
of annuity for which the amount of the periodic payment varies with 
the performance of underlying investment assets.179 Variable-contract 
annuities receive favorable tax treatment, subject to the requirement 
that the investments be diversified into securities issued or guaranteed 
by many different issuers.180 This diversification requirement is 
protected by a property rule, with failure resulting in severe tax 
consequences for the retiree, who must immediately include all income 
from the underlying assets on his or her tax return.181 
During the financial crisis, the Treasury gave a temporary federal 
guarantee to many of the money market funds that were the underlying 
investment behind variable-contract annuities.182 The federal 
guarantee resulted in an unambiguous violation of the diversification 
requirement, because the money market funds were invested 100 
percent in securities backed by the federal government.183 The 
property-rule remedy would normally result, but the IRS—which is a 
part of the Treasury—issued administrative guidance temporarily 
 
 176. Rev. Proc. 2010-12, 2010-3 I.R.B. 302.  
 177. See Wechsler, supra note 175, at 5 (“This guidance would result in no revenue loss to the 
fisc.”).  
 178. Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, SEC (Apr. 18, 2011), https://www.sec. 
gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsvaranntyhtm.html [https://perma.cc/PKD5-
VAHS] (“Variable annuities have become a part of the retirement and investment plans of many 
Americans.”). See generally Vorris J. Blankenship, Retirement Tax Planning with Personally 
Purchased Annuities, 113 TAX NOTES 459 (Oct. 30, 2006) (discussing the various types of 
annuities and their tax treatment).  
 179. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 12.3.3. 
 180. I.R.C. § 817(h) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5 (as amended in 2008).  
 181. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(a)(1).  
 182. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-92, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1001 § 1 (providing background).  
 183. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(h)(1)(i) (as amended in 2005).  
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suspending it.184 The Treasury also charged a premium for the 
guarantee,185 which compensated the government. The Treasury and 
IRS thus temporarily moved the diversification requirement from a 
property rule to a compensatory liability rule. 
4. Municipal Bonds.  The final example of a good IRS response, 
shifting temporarily to liability rules, involved municipal government 
bonds. These bonds give holders the extraordinary tax benefit that the 
interest they pay is excluded from the bondholder’s gross income.186 
This is an exception to the general rule that interest, such as interest 
earned on a bank savings account or a corporate bond, is taxable 
income.187 Municipal bonds lose their tax exemption if they are 
guaranteed, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the federal 
government.188 Losing this tax exemption would be devastating to the 
government that issued the bonds and to bondholders, such that a 
leading commentator likened that consequence to “the death 
penalty.”189 In short, a property rule protects the requirement that 
municipal bonds cannot be federally guaranteed. 
Money market funds can hold municipal bonds, and the investors 
in these funds receive the interest tax free.190 But during the 2008–09 
financial crisis, the Treasury temporarily guaranteed many tax-exempt 
money market funds, which would have triggered the property rule 
against any federal guarantees of a municipal bond, with devastating 
consequences.191 The IRS prevented this result by issuing 
administrative guidance suspending this property rule remedy.192 In its 
place, the Treasury charged a premium for the guarantee,193 which 
compensated the government. Thus, the no-federal-guarantee rule was 
shifted, temporarily, from a property rule to a liability rule. 
 
 
 184. I.R.S. Notice 2008-92, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1001.  
 185. Id. § 2.01 (“Participating money market funds are required to make premium payments 
to participate in the Program.”).  
 186. I.R.C. § 103 (2012).  
 187. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (including interest in the general definition of gross income).  
 188. I.R.C. § 149(b).  
 189. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 15.1.2.  
 190. I.R.C. § 852(b)(5). 
 191. See I.R.C. § 149(b) (2006).  
 192. I.R.S. Notice 2008-81, 2008-41 I.R.B. 852.  
 193. Id. § 2.01 (“Participating money market funds are required to make premium payments 
to participate in the Program.”).  
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B. Bad Responses: Temporary Moves to Nonenforcement for 
Property Rules.  
This Section describes the IRS’s five moves from property rules to 
total nonenforcement during the 2008–09 financial crisis. Given the 
speed with which the crisis unfolded, this simplistic approach was 
understandable. But these moves had serious drawbacks that imposed 
substantial costs on the economy, including unnecessary layoffs and 
home foreclosures. 
1. Short-Term Loans from Foreign Subsidiaries.  During the crisis, 
the IRS partially stopped enforcing rules restricting the ability of U.S. 
corporations to access cash belonging to their foreign subsidiaries. 
From the inception of the corporate tax until the passage of tax reform 
in late 2017,194 U.S. corporations generally owed no U.S. tax on income 
that their foreign subsidiaries earned by operating in foreign countries, 
as long as the cash the foreign subsidiary earned abroad was not 
brought back to the U.S. parent corporation.195 A foreign subsidiary 
might have repatriated cash back to the U.S. parent, thereby incurring 
U.S. taxes, by paying a straightforward dividend or by loaning the cash 
to the U.S. parent. Section 956 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC) would impose full, immediate U.S. taxation on loans to a U.S. 
parent from its foreign subsidiaries.196 Section 956 was a property rule 
 
 194. Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).  
 195. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 65.1.4; S. REP. No. 87-1881 (1962), reprinted in 
1962-3 C.B. 703, 784-85 (discussing this “tax deferral” and Congress’s enactment in 1962 of some 
limited exceptions to tax deferral, including what would be codified at I.R.C. § 956 (1964)). When 
the cash was repatriated, the U.S. corporation often received a credit for foreign income taxes 
paid. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 72.1; I.R.C. § 902 (2006). In late 2017, Congress 
passed the most fundamental changes ever to the U.S. tax rules governing foreign activities of 
U.S. corporations, imposing a one-time repatriation tax on foreign subsidiaries’ overseas earnings 
and then exempting taxation of money from foreign subsidiaries going forward. Pub. L. 115-97 § 
14101 (codified at I.R.C. § 245A (2012)); id. § 14103 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 965, 78, 904, 907); see 
H.R. REP. No. 115-466 at 598–99 (discussing new I.R.C. § 245A (2012)); id. at 613, 618 (discussing 
one-time repatriation tax). 
 196. I.R.C. § 956(a) (2006), (c)(1)(C); id. § 951(a)(1)(B). The amount of the loan is measured 
only at the end of each of the foreign subsidiary’s quarters, although a series of loans that end 
before the quarter-end and restart after the quarter-end would likely be recharacterized as, in 
substance, a loan. Rev. Rul. 89-73, 1989-1 C.B. 258; Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc. v. United States, No. 
CV 96-2662, 1997 WL 314167, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(unpublished table decision). Although § 956 was not amended by the 2017 tax reform legislation, 
Pub. L. 115-97, the substantial changes to the U.S. international tax rules in that legislation, see 
supra note 195, have rendered § 956 largely irrelevant or, if anything, a tool that taxpayers can 
use to reduce their tax bill. Andrew Velarde, Bottom Line: 956 Doesn’t Have Much Impact After 
Reform, 2018 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 12-6 (Jan. 18, 2018).  
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against such loans, since zero U.S. tax is due otherwise,197 and the rule 
could cause an infinite jump in taxes for such a loan.198 As the chief 
executive officer of one large company explained in 2008, these U.S. 
tax rules created an incentive against “repatriating even a penny of 
foreign profits.”199 To avoid triggering this property rule, U.S. 
corporations had stored over $1 trillion in cash in foreign subsidiaries 
by the height of the crisis in 2008.200  
The most destructive aspect of the 2008–09 financial crisis was its 
severe cash crunch, which left many U.S. corporations unable to 
borrow from banks or financial markets to meet regular cash needs, 
like paying employee salaries.201 A simple solution could have been to 
enable U.S. corporations to borrow temporarily from the $1 trillion in 
cash held by their foreign subsidiaries. But § 956’s property rule 
impeded companies from using this solution. 
 
 197. If a foreign subsidiary’s earnings remained indefinitely offshore, never subject to U.S. 
tax, then the present value of the future taxes that would have had to be paid was close to zero. 
Moreover, the foreign subsidiary’s earnings might have largely escaped U.S. tax by a tax holiday, 
as with Internal Revenue Code § 965 (2006), or by a corporate “inversion,” whereby the parent 
corporation merges with a foreign corporation that is not subject to U.S. tax.  
 198. A 35 percent U.S. tax on a foreign subsidiary’s earnings is infinitely higher than a 0 
percent U.S. tax on the same earnings.  
 199. James Tisch, Letter to the Editor, The Taxation of Overseas Earnings Creates Incentives, 
WALL STREET J., July 5, 2008, at A10. Section 956 influenced U.S. corporations’ behavior both in 
terms of cash taxes owed to the U.S. government and the financial accounting for taxes. See John 
R. Graham, Michelle Hanlon & Terry Shevlin, Real Effects of Accounting Rules: Evidence from 
Multinational Firms’ Investment Location and Profit Repatriation Decisions, 49 J. ACCT. RES. 137, 
181 (2011) (surveying U.S. corporations’ tax executives, and finding that “the importance of the 
financial accounting tax expense deferral is not statistically different from the importance of cash 
tax deferral”). For financial accounting purposes, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 23 
(APB 23) provided that U.S. taxes due on foreign subsidiary income were not included as an 
expense if the corporation stated that the earnings were “permanently reinvested,” meaning that 
U.S. tax would not have been due on those earnings for an indefinite period of time, which in turn 
means that they would not have been paid to the U.S. parent via dividend or a loan subject to 
§ 956. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, EXHIBITS TO HEARING ON 
OFFSHORE PROFIT SHIFTING AND THE U.S. TAX CODE 15–16 (2012) [hereinafter SENATE PSI 
REPORT], http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/ ?id=7B9717AF-592F-48BE-815B-FD8D38A7 
1663 [https://perma.cc/JLL2-RUPN]; see also FASB, Accounting for Income Taxes, Special Areas 
(ASC 740-30-25) (codifying APB 23). Section 956 arguably does have loopholes that companies 
exploited, but these tactics were legally dubious. SENATE PSI REPORT, supra, at 14–15, 24–27.  
 200. Overseas Earnings of Russell 1000 Tops $2 Trillion in 2013, AUDIT ANALYTICS tbl. (Apr. 
1, 2014), http://www.auditanalytics.com/blog/overseas-earnings-of-russell-1000-tops-2-trillion-in-
2013/ [https://perma.cc/DQB9-TFX2] (listing total foreign indefinitely reinvested earnings at 
$1,098,470,000,000 as of 2008). The amount of cash held by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies 
only grew after 2008 and was estimated at $2.6 trillion for 2015. Letter from Joint Committee on 
Taxation Staff to Reps. Kevin Brady & Richard Neal (Aug. 31, 2016), in 2016 TNT 190-22.  
 201. All You Need is Cash, supra note 140.  
BLAIR-STANEK IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2018  10:42 PM 
1186  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1155 
To allow U.S. parent companies to borrow from their foreign 
subsidiaries during the crisis, the IRS’s response was temporary 
nonenforcement of § 956, but only for 179 days out of the year.202 While 
this nonenforcement likely helped many corporations—and jobs—
survive the financial crisis, it was rightly criticized as a windfall for 
many other corporations,203 because corporations could violate § 956 
for up to 179 days per year regardless of whether they faced a cash 
crunch.204  
Yet many distressed U.S. corporations could not meet their cash 
needs with loans lasting just 179 days out of the year.205 They needed 
cash for operating expenses, such as paying employees, throughout the 
whole year. But the IRS could not countenance extending its 
nonenforcement beyond 179 days, to avoid giving too great a windfall 
to corporations that did not need the relief. 
A better alternative would have been a temporary shift to a 
liability rule that would have allowed U.S. corporations to borrow cash 
from their foreign subsidiaries while properly compensating the 
government. This compensation would have been equal to interest206 
on the amount of tax the U.S. parent would have owed if § 956 applied 
in full. For example, suppose that during the 2008–09 financial crisis, a 
cash-strapped U.S. corporation borrowed $100 million from its foreign 
 
 202. I.R.S. Notice 2008-91, 2008-43 I.R.B. 1001, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2009-10, 2009-5 
I.R.B. 419, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2010-12, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326. Specifically, the loans could be 
for a maximum of 60 days at a time, with loans outstanding from a foreign subsidiary for less than 
180 days total per year. Id. § 2. This guidance applied for the first two taxable years of a foreign 
corporation ending after October 3, 2008. Id. § 3.  
 203. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Subpart F and the Credit Meltdown, 121 TAX NOTES 127, 127 
(2008).  
 204. None of the IRS notices imposed a requirement that the taxpayer taking advantage of 
the requirement be facing cash shortages. See supra note 202.  
 205. See Stuart R. Lipeles & John D. McDonald, The Treasury Relaxes Code Sec. 956 During 
Crisis, 87 TAXES 5, 7 (2009); id. at 8 (“Notice 2008-91 . . . is, however, an incremental step that is 
not likely to make a dramatic impact. If the Treasury really wants to have a significant impact and 
help taxpayers that are having severe problems obtaining credit, it should . . . change the 60-/180-
day thresholds to something significantly longer.”); see also Ron Dabrowski & Alexey Manasuev, 
Liquidity, Certainty, and Rollover Loans: Notice 2008-91 and Relief From IRC Section 956, 57 
TAX NOTES INT’L 793, 799–800 (2010) (the notice’s 180-day time limit “may not allow taxpayers 
to fully benefit from the ‘liquidity relief’” intended by the notice).  
 206. The IRS already regularly calculates and publishes interest rates for use by taxpayers on 
underpayments of taxes, which is a similar situation. See I.R.C. § 6621(a)–(b) (2012). Professor 
Shu-Yi Oei has correctly noted that interest rates should be adjusted for riskiness and that 
governments cannot feasibly figure out each taxpayers’ riskiness and appropriate interest rate. 
See Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375, 400 (2014). But this concern is minimal 
here because the taxpayer has a much larger pot of cash available for payment, specifically the 
cash being loaned by the foreign subsidiary.  
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subsidiary for one year, and that § 956 would normally result in tax of 
$35 million.207 If the relevant interest rate was 10 percent,208 this 
proposed liability rule would have required the U.S. parent to pay $3.5 
million in additional taxes per year to compensate for violating § 956. 
Switching temporarily to this liability rule during the financial 
crisis would have had three practical benefits. First, it would have 
prevented windfalls to corporations that did not need the relief. 
Second, because the compensation would have been proportional to 
the time the loan was outstanding, a parent corporation would have 
had an incentive to repay the loan from its subsidiary once the parent’s 
cash crunch ended. Third, the compensation to the government would 
have made it palatable for policymakers to provide year-round relief 
throughout the crisis, rather than the 179-day relief that the IRS 
actually provided and that was insufficient for many companies.209 
This liability rule would almost certainly have saved jobs had it 
been in place during the 2008–09 financial crisis, because it would have 
provided many hard-hit companies with sufficient access to cash. The 
layoffs during the 2008–09 financial crisis resulted in large part from 
nonfinancial businesses lacking cash.210 A survey of chief financial 
officers of U.S. nonfinancial companies during the crisis found that 
those facing serious financial constraints planned substantial cuts in 
investment,211 which would reduce demand for investment in the short 
term and reduce productivity in the long term. Even more ominously, 
these cash-strapped companies also reported planning to slash their 
U.S. workforces by an average of 11 percent.212 
2. Foreign Subsidiary Loans for Securities Dealers.  The previous 
Section discussed how the IRS did not enforce § 956 during the 2008–
 
 207. This is calculated using the then-applicable 35 percent corporate tax rate applied to the 
loan amount. I.R.C. § 11. The U.S. parent’s tax due might have been lowered by the credit for any 
foreign taxes paid. See supra note 195. Assume for simplicity that the subsidiary paid zero foreign 
taxes through sophisticated tax planning.  
 208. For a discussion of the IRS’s ability to charge interest rates on underpayments of taxes, 
see supra note 206.  
 209. For a discussion of the insufficiency of the IRS’s relief for many companies, see supra 
note 205.  
 210. Murillo Campello, John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Real Effects of Financial 
Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 470, 477 (2010); All You Need is 
Cash, supra note 140; cf. PAULSON, supra note 28, at 227–28 (noting the connection between 
companies’ lack of access to cash and job cuts).  
 211. Campello et al., supra note 210, at 478.  
 212. Id. fig.2. By comparison, otherwise comparable firms facing less dire financial constraints 
planned an average workforce reduction of just 3 percent. Id.  
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09 financial crisis, but limited this nonenforcement to 179 days per year. 
The IRS also made another, quite different shift to not enforcing § 956; 
this shift applied solely to securities dealers. The IRS allowed U.S. 
securities dealers to borrow cash from their foreign subsidiaries—with 
no time limit.213 
Section 956 has an exception that allows securities dealers to 
borrow money tax free from their foreign subsidiaries, provided that 
the collateral backing the loan is “readily marketable securities.”214 
This “readily marketable” requirement is protected by a property rule, 
so that using securities that are not readily marketable as collateral 
results in the full amount of the loan from the foreign subsidiary being 
taxable under § 956’s general rule of immediate full taxation of the loan 
amount.215 
During the financial crisis, the IRS shifted to nonenforcement of 
the “readily marketable” requirement.216 U.S. securities dealers held 
piles of securities, like dubious mortgage-backed bonds, for which no 
ready market existed,217 because market participants suspected the 
securities had little value or were even worthless. The IRS’s 
nonenforcement allowed securities dealers to use those securities as 
collateral to borrow cash from their foreign subsidiaries without any 
time limit. 
Perversely, this slapdash move to nonenforcement created 
ambiguity and risk for the very U.S. securities dealers that the IRS 
hoped to benefit, because a related statutory provision limited the tax 
exclusion “to the extent the principal amount of the [cash borrowed] 
 
 213. Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1014, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2009-10, 2009-5 I.R.B. 
419, extended by I.R.S. Notice 2010-12, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326. The guidance theoretically applied to 
not only securities dealers, but also commodities dealers. But the guidance talks about secured 
borrowings involving securities, suggesting it applied overwhelmingly to securities dealers in 
practice.  
 214. I.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(J) (2006); see S. REP. No. 105-33, at 87–89 (1997). Congress passed this 
statute to enable cross-border lending between U.S. securities dealers and unrelated foreign 
parties, using the securities dealers’ foreign subsidiaries as middlemen to ease the nontax aspects 
of the transaction. See Philip Fried & Kevin J. Liss, CFCs—Investment of Earnings in United States 
Property, U.S. International Portfolios (BNA) No. 6260-1st, § VI.D (1st ed. 2014). But the statute 
does not actually require that an unrelated foreign party be involved.  
 215. I.R.C. § 956(c)(1)(C) (defining “an obligation of a United States person,” which includes 
a loan obligation of the U.S. parent corporation, as “United States property”).  
 216. Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-1 C.B. 1014 § 4; see also supra note 213.  
 217. Rev. Proc. 2008-26, 2008-21 I.R.B. 1014. (“For example, the Service will not challenge 
whether a mortgage-backed security . . . is ‘readily marketable . . . .’”); cf. Sullivan & Sheppard, 
supra note 24, at 14 (discussing Rev. Proc. 2008-26 and how it would be applied to “the toxic asset 
in question”).  
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does not exceed the fair market value” of the securities used as 
collateral.218 But the “fair market value” of these securities was 
completely unclear because the securities were not “readily 
marketable.”219 Years later, the IRS could potentially audit a securities 
dealer and argue that a security’s fair market value was substantially 
less than the cash borrowed from the foreign subsidiary using that 
security as collateral. The securities dealer would then owe tax on the 
difference. 
The IRS did not stop enforcing this “fair market value” limitation, 
because doing so would have been equivalent to total nonenforcement 
of § 956 for securities dealers, allowing them to repatriate nearly 
unlimited cash, tax free.220 To avoid giving such a generous unlimited 
windfall, the IRS moved to nonenforcement of only the “readily 
marketable” requirement. This half-hearted muddle by the IRS left 
ambiguity and risk, which kept many securities dealers from 
benefitting from it.221 
A better solution would have been temporarily moving to the 
same liability rule proposed in the previous Section—letting all U.S. 
corporations, not just securities dealers, borrow as much money from 
their foreign subsidiaries as they wanted, but requiring the 
corporations to compensate the government in proportion to the 
amount and length of the loan.222 That straightforward compensation 
formula would not have created severe legal uncertainty, unlike the 
IRS’s ad hoc nonenforcement of the “readily marketable” 
requirement. 
3. Bank Tax Attributes—A Windfall for Walls Fargo.  During the 
crisis, the IRS stopped enforcing some of the rules against corporations 
abusing “tax attributes.” When a corporation loses money or purchases 
assets that later fall in value, the result is a tax attribute that the 
corporation can use to shelter income in future years.223 The Supreme 
 
 218. I.R.C. § 956(c)(2)(J).  
 219. See supra note 217.  
 220. During the financial crisis, plenty of securities were available to purchase for a fraction 
of their face value. If the IRS had waived the fair market value limitation, a securities dealer could 
use just $1 million in U.S. cash to purchase subprime mortgage bonds with a face value of $100 
million, and use them as collateral to repatriate $100 million tax free from a foreign subsidiary.  
 221. Sullivan & Sheppard, supra note 24, at 14 (noting that Revenue Procedure 2008-26 would 
likely have limited effect, since “[s]ection 956(c)(2)(J) does say that the borrower cannot borrow 
more than the fair market value of the toxic asset in question”).  
 222. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 223. One type of tax attribute is the “net operating loss” (NOL), effectively representing a 
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Court explained that such tax attributes “were designed to permit a 
taxpayer to set off its lean years against its lush years.”224 
Tax attributes can, however, create perverse incentives to engage 
in corporate acquisitions that would not happen without the tax 
attributes. A corporation with lots of income might try to shelter its 
own future income by acquiring a company with lots of tax attributes. 
Permitting such tax-motivated acquisitions would distort acquisition 
decisions and enable acquiring corporations to shelter their income 
from tax.225 
Congress responded to this concern by enacting § 382 of the 
IRC.226 When one corporation acquires another,227 § 382 places strict 
limits on the use of tax attributes to shelter future income. Each year, 
the amount of tax attributes that can be used is set by a simple formula, 
multiplying the tax-exempt interest rate at the time of the acquisition228 
by the value of all the acquired company’s stock—that is, its stock 
market capitalization—at the time of the acquisition.229 Therefore, the 
smaller the acquired company’s stock market capitalization, the less 
the acquirer may use acquired tax attributes to reduce its income. 
During the 2008–09 financial crisis, this simple formula became a 
draconian property rule against acquiring troubled banks. Bank stocks 
plunged, which proportionally reduced § 382’s annual tax-attribute 
usage limit.230 Meanwhile banks’ tax attributes soared, as they lost ever 
 
year’s negative taxable income. I.R.C. § 172. Another type of tax attribute is a “net unrealized 
built-in loss,” which basically means that the corporation paid more for its assets than they are 
now worth. Id. § 382(h)(3)(A)(i). The corporation can often deduct losses by recognizing them, 
such as by selling them or, if the corporation is a bank, by charging them off to reflect its inability 
to collect from the borrowers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(d) (as amended in 1993).  
 224. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 42 (1976) (quoting Libson Shops, Inc. 
v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 (1957)).  
 225. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C 208-09 (1982).  
 226. I.R.C. § 382 (2012); see H.R. REP. No. 99-841, at 170–96 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).  
 227. Acquisition generally involves purchasing a majority of the acquiree’s stock. See I.R.C. 
§ 382(g).  
 228. I.R.C. § 382(f). This is typically the prevailing rate for low-risk municipal bonds, the 
interest on which is exempt from any federal income tax. This rate is calculated and published 
every month by the IRS in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & 
JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 
14.44[1][b] (7th ed. 2014) (“The exempt rate was apparently chosen in an attempt to offset any 
overvaluation of the corporation because of anticipated tax benefit from the future use of the 
losses.”).  
 229. I.R.C. § 382(b), (e)(1); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 228, ¶ 14.44[1][b].  
 230. The statutory language setting out the limitation formula, I.R.C. § 382(b)(1), looks to 
stock valuation, even if that valuation has plunged due to temporary factors. See Berry Petroleum 
Co. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 584, 637–40 (1995), aff’d, 142 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1998).  
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more money and the value of their loans and other assets plunged. 
Consider a simple hypothetical with banks X and Y buffeted by 
the financial crisis. In late 2008, each bank had $20 billion in tax 
attributes. Both expected to return to profitability with $10 billion in 
profits per year in 2010 and 2011 for each bank. Standing alone, X and 
Y can each avoid paying any taxes in 2010 or 2011, using their own tax 
attributes, because $10 billion of the tax attributes completely offset 
the $10 billion in profits in 2010, and the remaining $10 billion in tax 
attributes completely offset the $10 billion in profits in 2011. But 
suppose that the financial crisis drove Y’s stock market capitalization 
down to just $1 billion in late 2008. At that time, the tax-exempt 
interest rate was around 5 percent.231 If X acquired Y in late 2008, then 
the combined bank would have to pay tax on $9.95 billion232 in both 
2010 and 2011. But without the acquisition neither would have paid any 
taxes in either year. 
Section 382 thus became a draconian property rule against bank 
mergers, even when such mergers would increase financial stability, 
prevent bank runs, and be economically beneficial.233 The IRS correctly 
diagnosed this problem but promptly delivered the wrong cure—
nonenforcement.234 The IRS issued guidance that § 382 would simply 
not apply to most tax attributes of acquired banks.235 
In late 2008, the bank Wachovia had approximately $74 billion in 
tax attributes.236 Just two days after the IRS guidance, the bank Wells 
Fargo announced that it would acquire Wachovia.237 One industry 
 
 231. Rev. Rul. 2008-53, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1231 tbl.3 (promulgating the long-term tax-exempt rate 
for ownership changes in December 2008 as 5.40 percent).  
 232. The 5 percent tax-exempt rate multiplied by the $1 billion price of the target allows the 
merged bank to subtract only $0.05 billion of the target’s tax attributes—and all $10 billion of 
acquirer’s tax attributes—against their combined $20 billion in income, leaving $9.95 billion as 
taxable income.  
 233. Some commentators have reasonably argued that two banks merging often results in 
more stability primarily because it ensures too-big-to-fail status. E.g., ROUBINI & MIHM, supra 
note 25, at 224. But the Wells Fargo–Wachovia merger has apparently resulted in cost savings and 
better customer coverage. See Matthias Rieker, Wells Fargo’s Results Show More Benefits of 
Wachovia Deal, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527 
48704590704576091663157991174 [https://perma.cc/3BMR-X7PM].  
 234. Cf. Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the Income 
Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 831, 845–46 (2012) (observing that the IRS’s nonenforcement of the tax 
attribute rules had some precedent in the IRS’s nonenforcement in more mundane areas, like 
fringe benefits).  
 235. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905 (Oct. 20, 2008).  
 236. Let Uncle Sam Pay for Your Acquisition, HOVDE INDUSTRY UPDATE, Jan. 2009, at 2.  
 237. Binyamin Appelbaum, After Change in Tax Law, Wells Fargo Swoops In, WASH. POST 
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analyst calculated that the IRS’s nonenforcement saved Wells Fargo 
$22.5 billion in taxes after the Wachovia acquisition.238 Other banks 
that acquired struggling banks also likely benefitted from this 
nonenforcement.239 This largess drew criticism not only from scholars 
and tax commentators,240 but also from a bipartisan congressional 
chorus.241 Congress took the unusual step of repealing the IRS 
guidance, although Congress grandfathered in already-announced 
acquisitions like Wells Fargo and Wachovia.242 Instead of 
nonenforcement, the IRS should have shifted temporarily to a liability 
rule that compensated the government by limiting tax attributes, but 
with the limit calculated using the target’s market capitalization before 
the crisis started,243 rather than the normal rule of using the target’s 
market capitalization at the time of the acquisition.244 The limit would 
remain the tax-exempt interest rate multiplied by the target’s market 
capitalization,245 but the target’s market capitalization would be 
measured as of before the crisis, rather than the time of the acquisition, 
by which time the target’s stock would have plunged.246 This rule would 
still prevent garden-variety tax-motivated acquisitions, because a 
 
(Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/03/AR200810030 
1042.html [https://perma.cc/KK9M-LLND]. 
 238. Let Uncle Sam Pay for Your Acquisition, supra note 236, at 3. This analysis reasonably 
assumed a 33 percent effective tax rate. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 240. E.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Technical Objections to the Bailout, 121 TAX NOTES 20, 25 (2008) 
(“Even bank representatives were bowled over by the generosity of this notice.”); Thomas R. 
May, IRS Addresses Loss Limitations Amid Financial Crisis, 121 TAX NOTES 277, 279–80 (2008); 
Zelenak, supra note 24.  
 241. May, supra note 240, at 280 (noting that Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) criticized 
the Notice because it “likely will add billions of dollars to the deficit”); Chuck O’Toole, Baucus 
Calls for Special Inspector General to Look into Notices, 121 TAX NOTES 883 (2008) (quoting 
Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.)). The treasury inspector general found no ethical improprieties, 
only questionable policy. Memorandum from Rich Delmar, Counsel to Inspector Gen., Dep’t of 
the Treasury, to Eric M. Thorson, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of the Treasury (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Documents/Inquiry%20Regard 
ing%20IRS%20Notice%202008-83.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4QM-99EQ].  
 242. American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat. 
115, 342.  
 243. Determining when a crisis starts is the subject of Part III.B.5 below. 
 244. I.R.C. § 382(e)(1) (2012) (providing the rule that the value of the target corporation is 
measured “immediately before the ownership change”).  
 245. Id. § 382(b)(1) (setting out this formula). 
 246. Other compensatory liability rules are also possible that would keep § 382 from 
becoming a property rule against acquiring troubled companies during a crisis. For example, § 
382’s limit could be applied only to tax attributes that arose before the financial crisis; thus, the 
acquirer could use all tax attributes that arose once the financial crisis started.  
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company that was losing money—and thus generating tax attributes—
before the crisis started would have had a correspondingly low precrisis 
stock price. But the fall in a company’s stock price resulting from the 
crisis would not turn the § 382 limitation from a liability rule into a 
draconian property rule against all acquisitions. 
This proposed liability rule would ensure that tax law does not 
prevent acquisitions that would help stop a financial crisis. This liability 
rule would also prevent windfalls by preventing acquiring corporations 
from sheltering their future income using tax attributes already 
reflected as losses that depressed the target corporation’s stock price 
before the crisis started. 
4. Tax Attributes During Bailouts—A Windfall for General 
Motors.  The IRC section just discussed, § 382, is not limited to 
acquisitions of already-existing stock, like Wachovia’s stock in the 
example above. Section 382 also applies to acquiring new stock issued 
in exchange for putting more money into a corporation with tax 
attributes.247 
Consider a simple hypothetical where large investors are 
considering putting new capital either into company A or into company 
B. Suppose that B’s business opportunities are more economically 
promising than A’s business opportunities, meaning that investors and 
the economy would benefit more from investing in B. But suppose that 
B has no tax attributes, while A does have tax attributes, which would 
shelter A’s future income and thus increase the after-tax return to 
those investing in A. These tax attributes might distort the investors’ 
decisions towards choosing A. 
Section 382 aims to prevent such distorted investment decisions. 
The same severe limitations on tax attributes discussed in the previous 
Section apply whenever a new shareholder acquires more than 50 
percent of a corporation’s stock, even if the acquired stock is newly 
issued.248 This requirement is a property rule, because if investors step 
over the 50 percent ownership line, the severe penalty of permanently 
limited tax attributes kicks in immediately, even if the acquisition is 
only 51 percent. 
During the 2008–09 financial crisis, the federal government took 
 
 247. See id. § 382(g)(1). 
 248. The precise measurement of an ownership change is more complex and is detailed in 
§ 382(g) of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 228, at ¶ 
14.43 (explaining this change-of-ownership trigger).  
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ownership stakes of more than 50 percent in several corporations, 
including the carmaker General Motors (GM), the insurer American 
International Group (AIG), and the bank Citigroup.249 All three had 
substantial tax attributes, and § 382’s plain statutory language would 
have severely curtailed the use of their tax attributes. But the IRS 
shifted to total nonenforcement of § 382 for acquisitions by the federal 
government.250 
This nonenforcement substantially increased the value of these 
companies’ stock. For example, analysts’ research reports estimated 
that the preservation of GM’s tax attributes increased GM stock’s 
value by $12 billion.251 At first glance, this nonenforcement appears to 
be a relatively innocuous accounting shift to improve the appearance 
of the TARP bailout.252 The IRS gave up future tax revenue, garnering 
 
 249. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own 
Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y 
1, 3–4 (2011) (describing the U.S. Treasury’s acquisition of shares in GM after GM declared 
bankruptcy in June 2009).  
 250. I.R.S. Notice 2008-76, 2008-39 I.R.B. 768 (regarding federal government capital 
injections into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); I.R.S. Notice 2008-84, 2008-41 I.R.B. 855 
(regarding government as equity investor, issued right after the AIG bailout); I.R.S. Notice 2008-
100, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1081 (regarding government as equity investor via TARP), amplified by I.R.S. 
Notice 2009-14, 2009-7 I.R.B. 516, amplified by I.R.S. Notice 2009-38, 2009-18 I.R.B. 901, 
amplified by I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251 (specifically covering the government’s sale 
of its GM stock into the public markets).  
Congress ratified the IRS’s nonenforcement, solely with respect to the initial loan to GM 
by TARP, by enacting I.R.C. § 382(n) (2012), with the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1262(a), 123 Stat. 115, 343–44. But § 382(n)(2) expressly made subsection (n) 
not applicable to TARP’s subsequent sale of GM stock to the public. As a result, the IRS had to 
step in with Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251 § III.E. See generally Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra 
note 249, at 7–24 (explaining the IRS assistance in depth).  
The IRS also moved to total nonenforcement of a related statutory provision, I.R.C. 
§ 597(b)(3) (2006), which was implemented in Treas. Reg. §§ 1.597-2(a)(1), 1.597-1(b) (as 
amended in 2017). That statute bars double tax benefits to banks, which could otherwise exclude 
from gross income all government assistance that covered losses, while also deducting the losses. 
The IRS simply moved to nonenforcement of this provision with respect to TARP government 
assistance to banks. I.R.S. Notice 2008-101, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1082.  
 251. J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO., GENERAL MOTORS: REBORN, HIGH OCTANE SAAR AND 
PRODUCT PLAY; INITIATIVE WITH OVERWEIGHT 10 (Dec. 28, 2010) (“Via a special regulation, 
GM’s highly valuable US tax assets . . . were left intact. . . . we arrive at a PV for global economic 
tax assets ex[cluding] Europe of $12.4B at 2011-end.”); id. at 17 (explaining valuation 
methodology and adding “We estimate GM will not be a US cash taxpayer until ~2017.”); id. at 
85 tbl.31 (showing calculations); Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 10 (discussing stock 
analysts’ reports); Lubben, supra note 24 (describing the special tax treatment GM received); 
Smith & Terlep, supra note 24 (describing the practical effects on GM’s business as a result of the 
IRS notices).  
 252. Even tax practitioners who supported this IRS guidance admitted as much. See, e.g., 
Trivedi, supra note 24, at 1211 (quoting Todd B. Reinstein of Pepper Hamilton LLP as saying 
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little public attention, and gave it back to the bailout recipients, letting 
politicians and government officials crow about TARP’s relative 
success.253 In effect, money went from the government’s “IRS pocket” 
into the government’s “TARP pocket.” 
But a huge chunk of money leaving the IRS pocket wound up in 
other hands en route to the TARP pocket, because TARP owned only 
part of the stock of these bailout recipients. For example, TARP held 
only 61 percent of the shares of GM,254 so TARP only got 61 percent of 
the $12 billion in benefits from the IRS’s nonenforcement of § 382, 
which is approximately $7 billion.255 The remaining 39 percent of the 
value from nonenforcement—approximately $5 billion—went to 
shareholders other than the federal government.256 
A proportional liability rule provides a better alternative to 
nonenforcement of § 382 during government bailouts. This liability 
rule could be an additional tax on any dividends flowing to shares that 
were not issued to the federal government in exchange for the 
bailout.257 This tax would apply until the value of the tax attributes is 
recouped.258 This liability rule would compensate the federal 
government for the tax benefits that flow to other shareholders, who 
would no longer get a windfall. 
 
 
“the notices were ‘a really great idea’ that worked to prop up the value of those companies, 
making the government’s divestiture in them all the more profitable. ‘You’re enhancing the value 
without putting the cash in’”).  
 253. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 5.  
 254. BILL CANIS & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ROLE OF TARP 
ASSISTANCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF GENERAL MOTORS 10 (2014).  
 255. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 9 (observing that “$7.32 billion (= 0.61 x $12 
billion) was a tax gift [from the Treasury] to itself”).  
 256. Id.; Lubben, supra note 24.  
 257. In effect, this would create two classes of stock, stock that the federal government had 
owned and stock that it had not. The financial markets are well accustomed to trading and pricing 
multiple classes of stock.  
 258. The value of the tax attributes, which would determine when the additional tax would 
stop being charged, must already be calculated—and recalculated when applicable—by the 
corporation for financial accounting purposes, as the tax attributes show up as “deferred tax 
assets” on the balance sheet. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc., 2017 Annual Report 175, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000083100117000038/c-12312016x10k.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LEV6-FQ8M]; Citigroup, Inc., Form 8-K, Jan. 16, 2018, Exhibit 99.1, at 1, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000110465918002278/a18-3170_1ex99d1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KQ9A-WTUA]; Michael Rapoport, More Companies To Report Charges, 
WALL STREET J., Jan. 17, 2018, at B2 (explaining why Citigroup, GM and other companies must 
revalue their deferred tax assets).  
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5. Mortgage-Backed Bonds.  Mortgage-backed bonds played a 
central role in the 2008–09 financial crisis. In response, the IRS moved 
to partial nonenforcement of the tax rules governing mortgage-backed 
bonds, providing incomplete relief that led to unnecessary home 
foreclosures. 
When a homebuyer takes out a mortgage, the mortgage is typically 
pooled together with thousands of other mortgages, which are then 
“securitized” into multiple bonds sold to investors.259 The majority of 
all residential mortgages are securitized,260 and as of the end of 2008 
there were $8.9 trillion in mortgage-backed bonds outstanding.261 
Most mortgage-backed bonds are structured to qualify as Real 
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs),262 which are 
generally exempt from tax.263 In exchange for this favorable treatment, 
Congress imposed stringent requirements that effectively limit a 
 
 259. See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1080–87 (2009); 
Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 11–22 (2011) 
(providing excellent overview of mortgage securitization). Often the single pool of bonds issues 
multiple “tranches” of bonds, with different priority claims to payment. Gelpern & Levitin, supra, 
at 1084–85.  
 260. ANDREAS FUSTER & JAMES VICKERY, FED. RES. BANK OF NY, SECURITIZATION AND 
THE FIXED-RATE MORTGAGE 45 fig.1.B (2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/ 
media/research/staff_reports/sr594.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z3Q-EG7X] (showing that over time in 
excess of 80 percent of non-jumbo mortgages are either securitized by the Government-
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) or privately securitized); id. at 45 Fig. 1.A (showing that, except 
during 1999-2000 and 2007-08, over 50 percent of jumbo mortgages are either securitized by the 
GSEs or privately securitized); 2 INSIDE MORTG. FIN., 2007 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL 
ANNUAL 3 (2007) (showing that in 2006 67.7 percent of the total dollar amount of mortgages were 
securitized). 
 261. The Bond Market, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AGENCY, http://apps.finra.org/investor_ 
information/smart/bonds/401000.asp [https://perma.cc/ET83-2AVY]. 
 262. Marshall D. Feiring, REMICs, Mortgage REITs, Mortgage Trusts and Other Real Estate 
Mortgage Securitization Vehicles, U.S. Income Portfolios (BNA) No. 741-2d, § I.F (“REMICs are 
. . . the predominant form for issuing mortgage-backed securities.”); Levitin & Twomey, supra 
note 259, at 32 (noting “REMIC[s], [are] the typical form for PLS and some agency RMBS” and 
that grantor trusts are used for certain agency RMBS); Ingrid Szura, Nice Try: Why Revenue 
Procedure 2009-45 Will Not Curb the Rising Number of CMBS Loan Defaults, 37 MICH. REAL 
PROP. REV. 85, 86 (2010) (noting that commercial mortgage-backed bonds are generally 
REMICs). Some mortgage-backed bonds are issued not as REMICs but as grantor trusts, or 
“mortgage trusts,” but this arrangement allows much less flexibility, such as allowing only one 
class of debt without being subject to the punitive taxable mortgage pool (TMP) rules, I.R.C. 
§ 7701(i) (2012), and much less tax certainty, see Feiring, supra, § III.E.3. The analysis in this 
Section applies in full to mortgage trusts, which were dealt with in nearly identical terms by the 
revenue procedures discussed below.  
 263. I.R.C. § 860A(a) (2012). The bondholders are, of course, still taxed on the interest they 
receive. I.R.C. §§ 860A(b), 860B, 61(a)(4). Having no tax on the REMIC but tax on the 
bondholders is the reason for the word “conduit” in “Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit.”  
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REMIC to holding a fixed pool of mortgages,264 and required that a 
REMIC have “no powers to vary the composition of its mortgage 
assets.”265 At least 99 percent of a REMIC’s assets must be mortgages 
it acquires within its first three months of existence.266 For example, if 
a REMIC starts up in January and then acquires a mortgage in May of 
the same year, that mortgage does not count towards the stringent 99 
percent requirement. 
Losing REMIC qualification would be catastrophic,267 as all 
income from the underlying assets would become subject to full 
corporate taxation, permanently.268 Thus, the requirement that 99 
percent of a REMIC’s assets be mortgages it acquires within its first 
three months is protected by a property rule. 
This property rule created severe problems when the housing 
bubble burst. Many borrowers were unable or unwilling to pay their 
mortgages. The natural solution was renegotiating the mortgages, with 
some combination of forgiving principal, lowering interest rates, and 
lengthening repayment times.269 Both the Bush and Obama 
administrations had initiatives pushing such renegotiations.270 
Renegotiation could be a win-win for both homeowners and mortgage-
bond investors, enabling homeowners to keep their homes and avoid 
expensive, value-destroying foreclosure proceedings. 
But renegotiation of a mortgage is generally treated, for tax 
purposes, as if the original loan was replaced by a newly issued 
 
 264. I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4).  
 265. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 791–92 (1986); I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A) (limiting “qualified 
mortgage” largely to mortgages either transferred to the REMIC on its formation or within its 
first three months); see also Feiring, supra note 262, § IX.K.2 (noting that ever qualifying as a 
“qualified replacement mortgage” is “unlikely”).  
 266. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1992); Feiring, 
supra note 262, § IX.K.2 (observing that a REMIC may be able to qualify with less than 99 percent 
of its assets being qualified, but a REMIC tests the 99 percent limit “at one’s peril”). Assets closely 
related to the mortgages also count towards the 99 percent test. For example, a house received 
upon foreclosure of a REMIC’s mortgage counts, as does cash required to properly service the 
mortgage. I.R.C. § 860G(a)(5)–(8).  
 267. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 259, at 32–33 (“The economics of mortgage securitization 
only work if the RMBS have pass-through tax status; an additional level of taxation would add 
significant costs to securitization. Therefore, preservation of pass-through status is of paramount 
importance to investors and the trust.”).  
 268. Failure to qualify as a REMIC would generally cause the pool to be taxed as a TMP. 
I.R.C. § 7701(i); Feiring, supra note 262, §§ V.P, XI.A. There is a quite limited relief provision for 
REMIC failures, I.R.C. § 860D(b)(2)(B); see Feiring, supra note 262, § V.P., but there is no 
indication such as a private letter ruling that this relief provision has ever been applied.  
 269. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 259, at 1089.  
 270. BLINDER, supra note 134, at 327–38 (surveying the various initiatives).  
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mortgage with the new terms.271 If a REMIC renegotiates more than 1 
percent of its mortgages, it risks a catastrophic loss of tax 
qualification.272 This is no unintended quirk of tax law. Renegotiating 
mortgages is a  normal business activity for banks, which are subject to 
full corporate tax.273 In contrast, Congress expressly intended REMICs, 
which are generally exempt from tax, to be mere passive investment 
vehicles.274 Congress did not want REMICs to engage in bank-like 
business activity.275 This worry was reasonable, as clever lawyers have 
long tried to shoehorn bank-like activities into REMICs to avoid 
corporate tax.276  
During the financial crisis, the IRS correctly recognized the 
serious problem caused by the property rule about REMICs modifying 
mortgages. But the IRS moved from the property rule to 
nonenforcement, which had three serious failings. First, 
nonenforcement gave windfalls to REMICs that were able to profit 
from renegotiating qualifying mortgages. Because REMICs are tax 
free, these profits escaped taxation. Commentators and IRS officials 
voiced concern that nonenforcement was letting REMICs engage in 
many bank-like activities, tax free.277 
Second, and most importantly, the IRS’s fear of giving windfalls 
caused the IRS to keep its nonenforcement way too narrow. Rather 
than moving to nonenforcement for all troubled mortgages, the IRS 
allowed modification for only a crazy patchwork of mortgages. For 
example, REMICs could freely renegotiate adjustable-rate mortgages 
 
 271. Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(b)(1)–(2) (as amended in 2013); id. § 1.1001-3(a), (e) (as amended 
in 2013). De minimis renegotiations are generally not, however, treated as an exchange. Id. § 
1.1001-3(e). 
 272. A narrow exception is available if the renegotiation was “occasioned by default or a 
reasonably foreseeable default.” Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2013). But this 
exception provided little help. Millions of borrowers would likely default unless their mortgage 
were renegotiated, but their default could not qualify as “reasonably foreseeable.” Rev. Proc. 
2008-28, 2008-1 C.B. 1054 §§ 3.07, 5.04; Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. 
& Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Comments on Rev. Proc. 2008-28, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
July 15, 2008, at 149–17. 
 273. Feiring, supra note 262, § VI.B.1.  
 274. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.  
 275. Feiring, supra note 262, § VI.B.1. 
 276. Id. at ch. X (practice guides explaining how to subvert the existing REMIC rules to 
qualify corporations engaging in banking-type activities for REMICs’ tax-free treatment).  
 277. Lee A. Sheppard, Tax Administrator Also Copes with Credit Meltdown, 120 TAX NOTES 
1132, 1134 (2008) (“The IRS has not made a technical statement about whether forming a 
workout factory would qualify for REMIC status . . . . A REMIC is supposed to be a static pool 
of mortgages, while a workout factory might look more like a business.”).  
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taken out between January 1, 2005, and July 31, 2007.278 This relief was 
not available for standard fixed-rate mortgages, or for mortgages taken 
out before 2005. As another example, REMICs could freely 
renegotiate mortgages modified through a specific government-
sponsored modification program,279 but that program helped many 
fewer mortgages than expected.280 The most generalized 
nonenforcement that the IRS provided was allowing REMICs to freely 
renegotiate a mortgage with a “significant risk of foreclosure” if 
modifying that mortgage “substantially reduced [the] risk of 
foreclosure.”281 This vaguely worded relief was hemmed in by severe 
restrictions.282 In short, the IRS provided vastly underinclusive relief, 
which drew criticism from bankers and consumer advocates alike.283  
Third, even if a mortgage arguably qualified for the IRS’s 
nonenforcement, a REMIC would often still hesitate to renegotiate it, 
because the devastating property-rule remedy still lurked in the 
background. Consider the IRS nonenforcement that allowed 
renegotiating mortgages with a “significant risk of foreclosure”284 that 
was “substantially reduced”285 by the renegotiation. These vague 
standards inherently involve judgments about probabilities and 
counterfactual situations. For example, a “significant” risk of 
foreclosure might mean a 5 percent risk, a 51 percent risk, a 75 percent 
risk, or some other number. Similarly, a “substantial” risk reduction 
might mean a 5 percent reduction, a 90 percent reduction, or some 
 
 278. Rev. Proc. 2008-47, 2008-31 I.R.B. 272 § 2.03, amplifying Rev. Proc. 2007-72, 2007-2 C.B. 
1257.  
 279. Rev. Proc. 2009-23, 2009-17 I.R.B. 884 (dealing with Home Affordable Mortgage 
Program (HAMP)); see also I.R.S. Notice 2009-36, 2009-17 I.R.B. 883 (providing guidance on the 
tax treatment of government assistance being provided to REMICs by HAMP); Amy S. Elliott, 
IRS Expands REMIC Penalty Relief to Latest Housing Program, 123 TAX NOTES 279, 279 (2009) 
(noting several beneficial exceptions to protect REMICs from incurring an increased tax liability 
as a result of participating in HAMP). 
 280. BLINDER, supra note 134, at 335–36 (lamenting HAMP falling far short of its goals).  
 281. Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 2008-1 C.B. 1054 §§ 5.04 & 5.06 (applying to residential mortgages 
held by REMICs and mortgage trusts); Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471 §§ 5.03, 5.04 
(applying to commercial mortgages held by REMICs and mortgage trusts).  
 282. Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471, § 5.02(1) (preventing modification of any 
mortgages in a REMIC where over 10 percent of loans were in default or “reasonably 
foreseeable” default as of three months after the REMIC’s formation); Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 2008-
1 C.B. 1054 § 5.02(1) (imposing similar requirement).  
 283. See, e.g., Letter from Stephen A. O’Connor, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, and Anne C. 
Canfield, Consumer Mortg. Coal., to Internal Revenue Service, Regarding Internal Revenue 
Service Rev. Proc. 2008-28 (July 15, 2008).  
 284. Rev. Proc. 2008-28, 2008-1 C.B. 1054 § 5.04.  
 285. Id. § 5.06.  
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other number. This uncertainty left tax practitioners fretting, with one 
commenting that “it is hoped that the IRS would not second-guess the 
business judgment of a servicer or lender where the judgment of the 
servicer or lender is based on practical experience.”286 If the IRS did 
second-guess a REMIC, the result would be the devastating property 
rule. Many REMICs preferred not to run this risk and did not 
renegotiate troubled mortgages, letting them go to foreclosure instead. 
Instead of nonenforcement, the IRS could have moved 
temporarily to a liability rule that allowed all mortgage modifications, 
without limit, and imposed corporate taxes on any gains the REMIC 
achieved from the modifications.287 This liability rule would be easy to 
implement because it taxes the REMIC just like a normal corporation 
on its mortgage modifications. 
This liability rule would solve all three problems that arose from 
nonenforcement. First, no REMICs would have windfalls, since gains 
from modifications would be taxed at corporate rates, fully 
compensating the government for any erosion of the corporate tax 
base. If any REMIC engaged in the bank-like business of renegotiation 
for profit, the profits would be taxed at corporate rates just like banks. 
Second, all troubled mortgages could be renegotiated, not just those 
falling into the IRS’s underinclusive patchwork. The IRS could 
countenance such broad availability, as the liability rule prevents 
windfalls. Third, REMICs would no longer be scared away from 
modification by the combination of imprecise legal standards like 
“significant risk of foreclosure”288 and the devastating property rule 
that would apply if the IRS second-guessed the application of these 
standards.289 
 
 286. Feiring, supra note 262, § IX.K.4; see also Elliott, supra note 279, at 279 (quoting Richard 
Rydstrom, chair of the Coalition for Mortgage Industry Solutions, about the ambiguity of some 
of the standards in the guidance); cf. Steven Seidenberg, The Pain Spreads: It’s the Commercial 
Real Estate Market’s Turn To Take a Hit from the Financial Crisis, 96 A.B.A. J. 53, 56 (2010) 
(“Servicers, however, may be leery of relying on this guidance. . . . [A] servicer may not want to 
risk a REMIC’s tax status on the hope that a modification satisfies the somewhat vague criteria 
of the IRS revenue procedure.”).  
 287. The gain from a mortgage modification would be computed under standard tax principles 
as the fair market value of the modified mortgage, minus the REMIC’s adjusted basis in the 
mortgage. I.R.C. § 1001 (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.860F-2(c) (as amended in 1993) (REMIC’s 
basis in mortgage is generally fair market value upon acquisition). This liability-rule approach of 
applying the top corporate tax rate to earnings that should not normally be earned by a REMIC 
has precedent. Any property income that a REMIC receives, including income from foreclosing 
on mortgages, is taxed at full corporate tax rates. I.R.C. §§ 860G(a)(8), (c).  
 288. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.  
 289. Even if a liability rule does involve some ambiguity, it creates little risk since the 
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Tax law was not the sole impediment to REMICs modifying 
troubled mortgages.290 REMIC governing documents often make 
modifications difficult.291 But these documents do so precisely because 
their drafters feared losing REMIC tax status.292 A survey of these 
documents found a majority had language directly tracking the tax law 
language about REMICs modifying mortgages.293 
 
consequences of overlooking or misjudging the ambiguity is only a compensatory additional 
amount of tax. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1199–1200.  
 290. Professor Adam Levitin and consumer law attorney Tara Twomey have identified other 
nontax roadblocks preventing REMICs that primarily hold mortgages on residences, as opposed 
to mortgages on commercial properties, from modifying troubled mortgages. See Levitin & 
Twomey, supra note 259, at 69–84. First, residential mortgage REMIC governance structures do 
not properly align the incentives of the servicers who run the REMICs with the interests of the 
REMIC bond holders. Id. at 69–80. For example, servicers can often make more money through 
activities like foreclosure that may not maximize recovery from bond holders. Second, bond 
holders with different priority claims on the mortgage pool will often have competing interests. 
Id. at 82. Levitin and Twomey propose REMICs holding residential mortgages fix these problems 
by adopting the governance structures commonly used by REMICs holding commercial 
mortgages, such as mortgages on office buildings and shopping malls. Id. at 85–90. These 
proposals have great merit.  
But the superiority of commercial-mortgage REMIC governance demonstrates how the 
IRS’s response to the crisis was a key roadblock to all mortgage modification. Both residential 
and commercial mortgages in REMICs faced distress as a result of the financial crisis. The IRS 
extended nonenforcement of mortgage-modification prohibitions to a patchwork of both 
residential and commercial mortgages. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471–73; cf. 
T.D. 9463, 2009-40 I.R.B. 442 (Sept. 15, 2009) (permanent regulations providing modest 
additional commercial-mortgage REMIC relief).  
Yet the same three problems with the IRS’s nonenforcement of residential-mortgage 
modification rules applied with full force to commercial-mortgage modification. It created 
windfalls for lucky REMICs. It was underinclusive. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 
471 § 5.02 (barring relief if more than 10 percent of the commercial loans had had problems within 
the three months after the REMIC was formed); id. § 5.01 (barring relief for commercial 
mortgages on apartment buildings with three or four units). And it involved ambiguous standards 
that left REMICs exposed to the devastating property rule remedy if they were misinterpreted. 
See New REMIC Rules on Modifications, MORTGAGE BANKING, Oct. 2009, at 124 (quoting Jan 
Sternin, senior vice president of commercial/multifamily at the Mortgage Bankers Association, as 
saying, “[i]t will take some time for the servicers to determine how much latitude they have to 
implement the new IRS rules”); Seidenberg, supra note 286, at 56 (“Servicers, however, may be 
leery of relying on this guidance . . . . [A] servicer may not want to risk a REMIC’s tax status on 
the hope that a modification satisfies the somewhat vague criteria of the IRS revenue 
procedure.”). 
 291. These documents are often called Pooling and Servicing Agreements (PSAs). See 
generally Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 259 (discussing these contracts).  
 292. Seidenberg, supra note 286, at 56 (“[M]any pooling and service agreements were drafted 
with language that tracks the old IRS stance on modifications, thus prohibiting servicers from 
making modifications.”).  
 293. Specifically, a majority allowed modification only upon default or “reasonably 
foreseeable” default. John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually Say 
About Loan Modification?, 31 YALE J. REG. ONLINE 11, 15 (2013). This is the precise language 
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Effectively, the normal tax rules against a REMIC modifying its 
mortgages are baked into the governing documents of REMICs.294 
Baking tax requirements protected by property rules into governing 
documents generally makes sense, because failing such requirements 
generally has draconian consequences. But one undesirable result is 
that the whole system loses flexibility in times of crisis. Even though 
the IRS moved to nonenforcement of these property-rule 
requirements for some mortgages, many REMIC governing 
documents prevented taking advantage of the IRS’s action.295 
This unfortunate situation suggests a surprising benefit from 
arranging, before the next financial crisis, liability rules to temporarily 
replace property rules during crises. Prearranging moves to liability 
rules empowers drafters of private legal documents to make it possible 
to take advantage of the liability rules. For example, if tax 
policymakers announce that during future financial crises, the property 
rule restricting REMIC mortgage modifications will temporarily be 
replaced by the liability rule, then the drafters of REMIC governing 
documents can add provisions allowing REMICs to actually use the 
liability rules during the next crisis. In this way, preannouncing 
removes private contractual obstacles to responding to crises. 
III.  LESSONS FOR TAX LAW AND THE LITERATURE ON PROPERTY 
RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 
The previous Part examined the IRS’s ad hoc responses to the 
2008–09 financial crisis, all of which involved abandoning property 
rules that would have worsened the crisis. The bad responses shifted to 
nonenforcement, whereas the good responses shifted temporarily to 
liability rules, embodying the time-tested wisdom of both Ploof and 
Vincent. 
This Part distills and organizes nine specific lessons from the 
previous Part’s discussion. It starts by detailing the benefits of moving 
 
in the narrow exception allowing mortgage modification discussed supra note 272, including 
Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2013) (excepting “[c]hanges in the terms of the 
obligation occasioned by default or a reasonably foreseeable default”). 
 294. These governing documents are, in turn, themselves very difficult to modify. See Gelpern 
& Levitin, supra note 259, at 1087–1102.  
 295. See Szura, supra note 262, at 86 (“[T]he special servicer’s duties and obligations are 
defined by the existing PSA, which very likely does not reflect the flexibility of Rev. Proc. 2009-
45 with respect to modifications and workouts. . . . Therefore, unless the existing PSAs are 
modified . . . special servicers are tied to the old PSA restrictions regarding modifications . . . .”); 
accord Seidenberg, supra note 286, at 56.  
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to liability rules,296 and then discusses the considerable additional 
benefits of arranging these moves before the next crisis.297 Throughout, 
this Part demonstrates how these lessons can be used in various other 
areas of law to better respond to future financial crises, quick-
spreading epidemics, and bioterrorism. The Part concludes by 
considering objections to prearranging temporary moves to liability 
rules.298 
A. Benefits of Moving to Liability Rules in Any Crisis 
Even if policymakers have not already prepared moves from 
property rules to liability rules before a crisis comes, it still makes sense 
to move to liability rules. This Section discusses the benefits. 
1. Preventing Windfalls and Unnecessary Violations.  Liability 
rules provide compensation for violations, which prevents windfalls 
and creates incentives to avoid unnecessary violations. For example, 
the doctrine of necessity requires that boaters compensate dock 
owners, preventing windfalls to boaters and discouraging boaters from 
unnecessarily staying docked during a storm.299 Similarly, the liability 
rule that the IRS arranged for mutual funds’ 90 percent distribution 
requirement compensated the government for violations, keeping 
mutual funds from getting tax windfalls, and removed the incentive for 
unnecessary violations.300 
By contrast, the IRS’s bad responses, shifting to nonenforcement, 
created substantial windfalls. The IRS gave “tax gift[s]”301 to Wells 
Fargo and to GM. REMICs lucky enough to hold mortgages that the 
IRS permitted to be modified could profit from the modifications, yet 
pay zero tax on these profits. And not enforcing the property rule 
against loans from foreign subsidiaries gave a windfall to U.S. 
corporations that were not cash starved, but which nonetheless took 
tax-free 179-day loans from their foreign subsidiaries. None of these 
tax windfalls would have occurred had the IRS shifted temporarily to 
liability rules instead of to nonenforcement. 
This lesson applies in other areas of law. Consider constitutional 
 
 296. See infra Part III.A.  
 297. See infra Part III.B.  
 298. See infra Part III.C.  
 299. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.  
 300. See supra Part II.A.1.C.  
 301. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 9.  
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law’s current approach to quarantines—a move from property-rule 
protection for liberty interests to nonenforcement for a quarantined 
individual’s liberty. The predictable result is unnecessary quarantines; 
for example, in 2014 an American nurse returned to the United States 
from treating Ebola patients in Africa and was quarantined for several 
days, despite her Ebola-negative blood test results.302 If constitutional 
law adopted liability-rule protection for quarantined individuals, and 
required compensation, then governments would have a monetary 
incentive to avoid unnecessary quarantines where the costs imposed on 
the individual clearly exceed benefits to society. 
2. Making Broad, Clear Relaxation Palatable.  The windfalls and 
unnecessary violations created by moving to nonenforcement create 
pressure to keep nonenforcement remedies narrow and vaguely 
defined. But narrow or vaguely defined relief hampers crisis responses. 
Consider the IRS’s half-hearted shifts to nonenforcement of 
§ 956’s property rule against U.S. corporations borrowing cash from 
their foreign subsidiaries.303 Properly designed temporary relief from 
§ 956 could have been an excellent solution to the cash shortage at the 
core of both the financial crisis and its spillover into the real economy. 
But the IRS feared giving windfalls that were too large, so its responses 
were too narrow304 and fraught with legal uncertainty.305 Similarly, the 
IRS’s move to nonenforcement for the property rule against REMICs 
modifying mortgages similarly resulted in relief that was too narrow306 
and plagued with uncertainty,307 all because the IRS reasonably feared 
that REMICs would reap tax-free windfalls on profits from modifying 
 
 302. See Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp.3d 579, 585–88, 605 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2016) (relating 
facts around nurse Kaci Hickox’s involuntary quarantine and rejecting Hickox’s claims for 
monetary damages due to the New Jersey defendants’ qualified immunity).  
 303. See supra Parts II.B.1, 2. 
 304. Narrowness manifested itself in the IRS allowing all U.S. corporations to borrow 
unlimited cash from foreign subsidiaries, but limiting this to only 179 days per year. See supra note 
202. This narrow relief was insufficient for many businesses, which conserved cash by slashing 
investment and laying off employees. See supra notes 205, 211, 212 and accompanying text. 
 305. Uncertainty resulted from the IRS allowing securities dealers to borrow using securities 
that were not “readily marketable” as collateral, see supra note 216, but retaining the requirement 
that the loan amount not exceed the securities’ fair market value, which was impossible to 
determine because no market existed. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 278.  
 307. For a discussion of vagueness in terms such as “significant risk of foreclosure,” see supra 
note 281–282 and accompanying text. For practitioner concerns over these vague terms, see supra 
note 286.  
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mortgages.308 But the IRS could have provided clear, broad relief 
without the possibility of windfalls by moving instead to a 
compensatory liability rule. 
This lesson applies to other areas of law. Constitutional law 
currently views liberty interests as protectable only by property-rule 
remedies, although in crises like epidemics, courts typically move 
clumsily to nonenforcement.309 As a result, the law governing 
quarantines and other measures to handle crises is uncertain.310 If 
constitutional law allowed temporary liability rules during crises, the 
law could become clearer and more certain. 
3. Minimizing Contagion.  Tort law’s temporary move from 
property rules to liability rules during storms minimizes total damage 
to two parties, boaters and dock owners. By contrast, similar temporary 
moves to liability rules in other areas of law can have much broader 
benefits, preventing contagion that harms third parties. 
For example, the IRS’s response for mutual funds311 prevented fire 
sales of assets that would have harmed third parties holding such assets 
and that would have deepened the crisis and economic harm.312 The 
IRS’s mutual fund response also likely prevented cascading 
insolvencies of financial institutions.313 
As another example, bankruptcy law moving to temporary 
liability rules for repos would prevent contagion through fire sales 
caused by creditors seizing and selling the securities used as collateral 
in repos by troubled debtors like Lehman Brothers.314 Similarly, patent 
law’s move to temporary liability rules for epidemic-fighting drug 
patents makes it easier for all manufacturers to rush generic versions 
to stop a disease’s contagion from person to person. 
B. Benefits of Prearranging These Moves Before the Next Crisis 
The previous Section detailed the benefits of moving temporarily 
from property rules to liability rules during crises. Those benefits come 
 
 308. Feiring, supra note 262, § X (guide to potential abuses).  
 309. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 780–86.  
 310. Id. at 803–05.  
 311. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 312. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.  
 313. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.  
 314. See Morrison et al, supra note 117, at 1030–31. Note that Morrison, Roe, and Sontchi do 
not argue for pliability rules, but argue—without using the term—for permanently moving to 
liability rules.  
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even when the liability rules are created on the fly to respond to the 
crisis. This Section details benefits, previously unrecognized in the 
literature, that policymakers can achieve through pliability rules, by 
announcing both the liability rule and the trigger for temporarily 
moving to it in advance of any crisis. 
1. Speed.  Triggering liability rules quickly minimizes the harm 
from crises; when a boat is caught in a storm, the sooner the boat is 
allowed to use a dock, the less likely the boat is to shipwreck. Speed is 
similarly essential in responding to financial crises,315 where the loss of 
confidence in a financial institution can cause its failure literally 
overnight.316 But the IRS moves slowly in issuing new guidance.317 For 
example, the guidance318 shifting the 90 percent distribution 
requirement for mutual funds came in January 2009, several months 
into the financial crisis.319 The only way to ensure a speedy IRS 
response is to prepare for the switch to a liability rule in advance. 
This lesson applies to many other areas of law. Consider patent 
law. Society can best respond to a quick-spreading epidemic if a 
preexisting framework exists to permit all manufacturers to make 
patented drugs that would fight the epidemic, with compensation to 
patent holders. Such a framework does not currently exist. The U.S. 
government’s response to the 2001 anthrax scare provides a warning. 
The antibiotic ciprofloxacin (Cipro) was considered by experts to be 
the best drug to treat anthrax, and Bayer AG held the patent.320 Bayer 
lacked capacity to provide Cipro for the entire U.S. population and 
refused to voluntarily license other manufacturers to meet the needs of 
the United States.321 Prearranging procedures for speedy shifts to 
 
 315. See PAULSON, supra note 28, at 244 (recalling that, in order to stem the crisis, “our actions 
had to be decisive and overwhelming”).  
 316. See id. at 362 (noting that, in contrast to industrial companies, “[a] financial institution 
could go under immediately if it lost the confidence of creditors and clients”); ROUBINI & MIHM, 
supra note 25, at 112–13.  
 317. Sheppard, supra note 203, at 128 (observing that “we take paralysis in tax administration 
for granted”).  
 318. Rev. Proc. 2009-15, 2009-4 I.R.B. 356; see Part II.A.1. 
 319. In comparison, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.  
 320. Resnik & De Ville, supra note 127, at 29–30; see also T. Inglesby et al., Anthrax as a 
Biological Weapon, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1735, 1740–41 (1999) (reviewing evidence that shows 
Cipro is the best treatment for those exposed to anthrax). 
 321. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Biomedical Patents and the Public’s Health: Is There 
a Role for Eminent Domain?, 25 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 434, 434 (2006); Lody Petersen & Robert 
Pear, Anthrax Fears Send Demand for Drug Far Beyond Output, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at 
A1.  
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liability rules for patents that can fight epidemics or bioterrorism are 
clearly in society’s best interests. 
Bankruptcy law could also best respond to a financial crisis by 
having speedy prearranged shifts to liability rules for repo contracts. 
Repo creditors have a property-rule right to seize the securities used as 
collateral,322 which incentivizes seizing collateral at the first sign that 
the debtor is having trouble.323 Lehman Brothers is a case in point. 
Lehman borrowed heavily using repo contracts, and the moment repo 
creditors lost confidence, it failed.324 Lehman’s failure was effectively a 
bank run as repo creditors exercised their property-rule rights to seize 
the collateral.325 Stemming this outflow quickly is essential to stopping 
the bank run, and a speedy prearranged shift to liability rules facilitates 
this stop. 
2. Avoiding Moral Hazard.  This benefit is counterintuitive. This 
Article earlier explained why the doctrine of necessity does not create 
moral hazard for boaters,326 and why temporary shifts to liability rules 
in tax law do not create moral hazard for taxpayers.327 But 
preannouncing the shifts to liability rules can even reduce moral hazard 
if parties already assume that property rules will be moved to 
nonenforcement in a crisis. 
For example, the IRS’s moves to nonenforcement during the 
2008–09 financial crisis gave windfalls to a number of taxpayers, like 
Wells Fargo.328 Taxpayers probably expect that the IRS will make 
similar moves to nonenforcement in the next crisis. Recall that moral 
hazard exists in “any situation in which one person makes the decision 
about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things 
go badly.”329 Taxpayers expecting to benefit from nonenforcement will 
make decisions about how much risk to take prior to crises and expect 
the government to bear the cost through nonenforcement when things 
go badly and the crisis arrives. The current state of affairs thus creates 
 
 322. See supra note 119.  
 323. See supra notes 121–22.  
 324. 1 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Bankruptcy Examiner at 3, In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).  
 325. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. 
ECON. 425, 425, 433 (2012).  
 326. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.  
 327. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 328. See supra Part II.B.  
 329. KRUGMAN, supra note 99, at 63.  
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moral hazard. Tax law can eliminate this moral hazard simply by 
prearranging the shifts to liability rules for future crises, thereby 
disabusing taxpayers from expecting nonenforcement. 
Constitutional law offers a similar lesson. Courts move to 
nonenforcement of liberty entitlements for individuals quarantined 
during epidemics.330 Lawmakers routinely make decisions on scientific 
research and mosquito control that impact the risk of an epidemic, and 
likely spend suboptimal amounts of money.331 This underspending can 
be explained, in part, by lawmaker knowledge that if an epidemic 
starts, the government need not compensate quarantined individuals. 
Constitutional law’s nonenforcement of individual liberty during 
epidemics thus creates moral hazard, because lawmakers decide how 
much risk to take, while the quarantined individuals will bear much of 
the cost if things go badly and an epidemic emerges. But if epidemics 
caused liability-rule protection for quarantined individuals, requiring 
government compensation, then this moral hazard would disappear. 
3. Transparency in Liability-Rule Compensation.  Scholars have 
long recognized that liability rules may be seriously 
undercompensatory or overcompensatory, thus skewing incentives and 
inviting opportunistic behavior.332 Liability rules created on the fly in 
response to a crisis are much more likely to undercompensate or 
overcompensate. Moreover, in the heat of a crisis, public attention 
tends to focus on splashier issues than the design of liability rules,333 
making midcrisis correction unlikely. The best way to design liability 
rules that get incentives right is to announce in advance how they will 
be calculated, and to subject them to public scrutiny and revision. 
4. Encouraging Flexible Legal Arrangements.  Prearranged 
pliability rules provide legal certainty.334 Knowing the circumstances 
 
 330. See supra note 115.  
 331. See, e.g., Emmarie Huetteman, Five Things To Know About Congress’s Fight over Zika, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/us/politics/five-things-to-know-
about-congresss-fight-over-zika.html [https://perma.cc/MAZ6-8C82]; Kristina Peterson, 
Congress Releases Funding To Aid Fight Against Ebola: Ends Delay by Lawmakers Seeking More 
Information on Administration’s Strategy, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/congress-releases-funding-to-aid-fight-against-ebola-1412959345 [https://perma.cc/VYW 
5-U4UZ].  
 332. See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 61, at 199; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 37, at 730–32; Henry 
E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1743 (2004). 
 333. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 249, at 5.  
 334. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 27 (observing that pliability rules provide 
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that trigger switching temporarily to a liability rule and knowing the 
content of that liability rule enable parties to plan ahead, including 
designing their contracts and other legal arrangements to respond most 
efficiently.335 
Recall the problem seen with REMIC governing documents, 
which were drafted before the 2008–09 crisis under the assumption that 
the property rule against mortgage modifications would always apply 
in full.336 During the crisis, the IRS shifted to nonenforcement for some 
mortgage modifications, but their governing documents barred 
REMICs from taking advantage of even this limited 
nonenforcement.337 This inflexibility baked into the documents 
doubtless encouraged more home foreclosures.338 
Prearranging pliability rules for crises would prevent such 
problems. A REMIC’s governing document could arrange for the 
REMIC to take advantage of the liability rule. The document could 
also handle important questions such as who decides which mortgages 
to modify, using what criteria, and how any gains or losses from the 
modifications would be allocated between different bondholders in the 
REMIC.339 
Prearranging pliability rules would allow private contracts to 
adapt across many areas of law. In patent law, pliability rules for 
patented drugs that fight epidemics would enable manufacturers to 
have supply contracts in place to rush drugs to stem the epidemic. If 
constitutional law adopted a pliability rule providing compensation for 
quarantined individuals during epidemics, then union-bargained 
contracts of employees most likely to be quarantined, such as 
healthcare workers and airline employees, could provide for matters 
such as allocating the compensation.340 If bankruptcy law had a 
 
“certainty concerning future changes in the rules protecting their entitlements, and, therefore, a 
truer appreciation of the nature of protection they enjoy at present”).  
 335. Id.; id. at 78–79 (observing the substantial benefits of the “post-petition rules of 
bankruptcy [which] are relatively clear and can be planned for”); id. at 57 (noting that adverse 
possession, which is a type of pliability rule, “facilitate[s] trade and reduce[s] conflicts”).  
 336. See supra notes 292, 293.  
 337. See supra notes 292, 293, 295 and accompanying text.  
 338. See supra note 283.  
 339. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 259, at 85–90 (discussing how governing documents 
for REMICs holding commercial mortgages, unlike governing documents for REMICs holding 
residential mortgages, handle many such matters). For a collection of sources about how even 
commercial-mortgage REMICs had problems taking advantage of the IRS’s nonenforcement 
because their governing documents baked in the property rules, see supra note 290. 
 340. Recall that the SARS outbreak caused serious financial losses for airlines. Painful Side-
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pliability rule for repo borrowing, that would likely result in the 
industry-standardized repo contracts341 accommodating temporary 
moves to a liability rule. 
5. Discretionary Versus Automatic Triggers.  A pliability rule 
moves from a property rule to a liability rule when a trigger is met.342 
Triggers can be designed in advance to maximize effectiveness and to 
minimize the potential for abuse. Most importantly, triggers can be 
either discretionary or automatic. A discretionary trigger gives one or 
more officials the power to decide when the property rule moves to a 
liability rule. An automatic trigger moves to a liability rule when some 
objective criterion is met. 
An automatic trigger responding to a financial crisis might involve 
market-related data reaching thresholds that have indicated financial 
crises in the past. For example, the trigger could be the average interest 
rate paid on moderate-risk corporate bonds exceeding the interest rate 
on ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds by more than 5.0 percent.343 Another 
trigger might involve the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s widely 
followed Financial Stress Index, which is based on statistical 
relationships between several market indicators.344 A crisis could be 
triggered automatically when this Financial Stress Index exceeds a high 
numerical threshold.345 Similarly, an automatic trigger responding to a 
quick-spreading epidemic might come into play when a prespecified 
number of people in the United States are diagnosed with the disease. 
 
Effects, ECONOMIST (May 5, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1747241 [https://perma.cc/ 
8PL9-2W2J]. 
 341. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N & INT’L CAPITAL MKT. ASS’N, GLOBAL MASTER 
REPURCHASE AGREEMENT ¶ 2(a), 10 (2011), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
08/Global-Master-Repurchase-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J4K-SKX3].  
 342. To use Bell and Parchomovsky’s terminology, pliability rules that move from a generally 
applicable property rule to a liability rule are “classic” pliability rules. Bell & Parchomovsky, 
supra note 10, at 31. This Article uses a slight variation, defining “classic” pliability rules as those 
where the switch to a liability rule is temporary.  
 343. See BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate BBB Option-Adjusted Spread, FED. RES. BANK 
ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLC0A4CBBB [https://perma.cc/CQF2-YTG2]. 
The New York State Bar Association has proposed that the IRS use precisely such an automatic 
trigger before it applies its explicit statutory authority to suspend certain deduction-denying and 
-delaying provisions. See AHYDO Report, supra note 129, at 9–10 (noting that “[i]n the last 
approximately twenty years, this condition would have been present only between September 
2008 and May 2009”).  
 344. St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, https://fred.stlouisfed. 
org/series/STLFSI [https://perma.cc/J763-XJSF].  
 345. For example, the threshold could be 1.0. By comparison, the index reached 5.455 on 
October 17, 2008, at the height of the financial crisis. Id.  
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A discretionary trigger would involve an official or body deciding 
when a crisis exists, based on some standard.346 The discretion for 
declaring a financial crisis might be given to the Treasury secretary, 
whose department includes not only the IRS, but also a number of 
other agencies that keep it highly attuned to the entire financial 
system.347 Indeed, Congress has given discretion to the Treasury 
secretary in several analogous situations.348 For epidemics, a 
discretionary trigger might be given to health officials such as the 
surgeon general.349 
Automatic triggers and discretionary triggers each have their 
respective strengths and weaknesses. Discretionary triggers can be 
abused if the official unwisely triggers them (or refuses to trigger them) 
to serve ulterior motives.350 For example, the Treasury secretary may 
 
 346. This discretionary approach is taken in the doctrine of necessity, where the relevant 
official is a judge, who decides whether a necessity existed using a specific standard. See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmts. a–k (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (establishing various 
standards to determine whether the doctrine of necessity applies). The body making the decision 
could also be as broad as the entire electorate voting in a referendum. E.g., Rachel D. Godsil, 
Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1875–78 (2004).  
 347. See, e.g., PAULSON, supra note 28, at 49.  
 348. Congress has permanently granted the Treasury secretary statutory power to suspend 
certain tax rules disallowing certain bond interest deductions “if the Secretary determines that 
such application is appropriate in light of distressed conditions in the debt capital markets.” I.R.C. 
§ 163(e)(5)(F)(iii) (2012). This discretion has been exercised once. I.R.S. Notice 2010-11, 2010-4 
I.R.B. 326; see also AHYDO Report, supra note 129, at 7 & 9 (providing background on this 
exercise of discretion). Outside of tax law, the Treasury secretary has discretion to suspend certain 
bank regulations upon determining that doing so would “avoid or mitigate” “serious adverse 
effects on economic conditions or financial stability.” 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(I), (II) (2012). 
The bank regulations that are thus waived involve the requirement that least-cost procedures be 
used to resolve insolvent banks. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(A). Before exercising this discretion, the 
secretary must consult with the president and get approval from both the Federal Reserve board 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation board. Id. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i). During the 2008–
09 financial crisis, the Treasury secretary exercised this discretion several times. The Treasury 
secretary used this power to set up the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) and to 
assist Citigroup. 2010 Annual Report: IV. Financial Statements and Notes, FDIC, https://www.fdic. 
gov/about/strategic/report/2010annualreport/chpt4-01.html [https://perma.cc/W3VV-58KG]. 
 349. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012) (granting quarantine powers to “[t]he Surgeon General, 
with the approval of the Secretary” of Health and Human Services); N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:4–2(d)–
(e) (2013) (granting quarantine powers to state and local health departments).  
 350. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 10, at 77 (“[T]he identity of the party exercising that 
discretion naturally affects the incentive effects of the pliability rule.”); see, e.g., Hickox v. 
Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 584 (D.N.J. 2016) (governor who was also a candidate for president 
arguably quarantined a nurse to further his presidential prospects); Letter from Ralph Nader and 
James Love, Consumer Project on Tech., to DHHS Secretary Tommy Thompson (Oct. 18, 2001), 
reprinted in CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., [hereinafter Letter to Tommy Thompson] 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/nadethom10182001.html [https:// perma.cc/33GL-F7TL] 
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have close connections to a financial institution that is the debtor in 
many repo contracts and would thus benefit from triggering the 
bankruptcy rules for repos to move to liability rules. Or the surgeon 
general may have sympathies for generic drug manufacturers. 
Automatic triggers avoid such abuse,351 but also put the pliability rule 
on autopilot that may fail to be triggered. The relative advantages of 
discretionary versus automatic triggers for pliability rules are an area 
particularly ripe for further scholarship. 
6. Establishing Proper Legal Authority.  During a crisis, moving 
from a property rule to a liability rule may be good policy, but may not 
be possible if the relevant agency has no statutory authority to impose 
a compensatory liability rule. The IRS achieved its four good crisis 
responses—that is, temporary liability rules—discussed earlier352 
through very creative interpretation of the applicable provisions.353 But 
many crisis-worsening requirements may not be susceptible to such 
creative interpretations. Planning ahead for the temporary moves to 
liability rules ensures that the government can arrange proper legal 
authority. 
In tax law, the IRS can arguably arrange such moves in advance 
by aggressively using closing agreements, which are written 
agreements between the IRS and a taxpayer specifying some aspect of 
the taxpayer’s tax treatment.354 The IRS could promulgate a closing 
agreement that changes a particular property rule into a liability rule 
and announce that, during a future crisis, it will automatically enter into 
 
(accusing DHHS Secretary Thompson of not using 28 U.S.C. § 1498 discretion to compulsorily 
license Cipro to fight anthrax for ideological reasons).  
 351. Richard Epstein, a leading proponent of property rules, notes that when law departs 
from the norm of property rules to liability rules, it hems in their use with extensive institutional 
safeguards to prevent mischief. Epstein, supra note 102, at 2111–20. This insight applies in full to 
triggering mechanisms that move to liability rules. 
 352. See supra Part II.A.  
 353. With mutual funds and REITs, the IRS built upon preexisting legal theories explored 
long before the crisis in handling particular taxpayer situations. See, e.g., IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
200615024 (Jan. 10, 2006) (applying I.R.C. § 305(b) (2000) to count paper dividends as real 
dividends). For variable annuities and the guaranteed municipal bonds, the Treasury creatively 
used a longstanding statutory provision to charge the compensatory guarantee fee. 31 U.S.C. § 
5302 (2006); see CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT 
PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 24 (2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT 
-111JPRT53348/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT53348.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EEE-AL3G]. This creative 
legal interpretation was criticized on several grounds. Id. at 69–71. 
 354. I.R.C. § 7121 (2012) (grant of authority applicable to “any internal revenue tax for any 
taxable period”); Treas. Reg. §301.7121-1(b)(2)–(3) (2017) (closing agreements may cover any 
past, current, or future tax issue); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 165, ¶ 9.09.  
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that closing agreement with any taxpayer that requests it. Such use of 
closing agreements has precedent. The IRS has already used closing 
agreements to permanently turn several tax law requirements that the 
IRC protects with property rules into being protected by de facto 
liability rules.355 Congress is well aware of the IRS’s longstanding 
aggressive use of closing agreements,356 which are, moreover, 
effectively immune from judicial challenge.357 Nonetheless, the IRS 
 
 355. Municipal bonds and pensions plans are the two areas where the IRS has permanently 
turned property-rule requirements into liability-rule requirements via the closing agreement 
power. Many of the requirements for a municipal bond to be tax exempt are protected by the 
property-rule remedy of losing tax exemption for the bond, which would be disastrous. BITTKER 
& LOKKEN, supra note 138, ¶ 15.1 (analogizing losing tax exempt status to the death penalty); 
Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1183–84. Similarly, many of the requirements for a pension plan to 
be tax free are protected by the harsh property-rule remedy of taxing both the plan trust itself 
and the future retirees. Blair-Stanek, supra note 10, at 1184–85. But administrative guidance from 
the IRS has permanently changed almost all these requirements to liability-rule protection 
through closing-agreement programs. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2013-12, 2013-4 I.R.B. 313 (retirement 
plan Audit Closing Agreement Program); Rev. Proc. 97-15 § 6, modified by Notice 2008-31, 2008-
1 C.B. 592, modified by Notice 2001-60, 2001-2 C.B. 304. For example, if a pension plan violates 
a requirement protected by a property rule, IRS guidance allows the plan to keep its tax 
qualification by paying a compensatory amount proportional to the harm, calculated using a 
number of factors. Rev. Proc. 2013-12 §§ 14.01, 5.01(5). Basically, this guidance moves the 
statutory property-rule remedy to a liability rule. These moves are a well-settled part of the tax 
landscape. See JAMES A. CONIGLIO, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING ¶ 6:21 
(2d ed. 2014); PAMELA D. PERDUE, QUALIFIED PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS ¶ 19.02 
(2014). IRS employees work from standardized processes and standardized forms. See, e.g., IRM 
§ 7.11.8.2.3 (“Preparing the Draft Closing Agreement.”); IRM exhibit 7.2.1-1 (“Closing 
Agreement on Final Determination Covering Specific Matters.”). 
The same broad closing-agreement authority could arrange for crisis-worsening property 
rules to temporarily become liability rules during financial crises. The IRS’s guidance would 
provide a standardized closing agreement whereby the IRS agreed not to enforce the property 
rule during the crisis, in consideration for the taxpayer agreeing to pay a liability-rule amount of 
extra tax calculated according to the agreement. Cf. Rink v. Comm’r, 47 F.3d 168, 171 (6th Cir. 
1995) (“A closing agreement is a contract, and generally is interpreted under ordinary contract 
principles.”). Once the crisis was declared, all affected taxpayers could submit the standardized 
agreement, to which the IRS would automatically agree.  
 356. Congressional reports favorably discuss the sources listed supra note 355 as part of 
existing tax law. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVINGS 28–29 (Comm. Print, 
2014).  
 357. The taxpayers who submitted these agreements would be bound. I.R.C. § 7121(b) 
(“[S]uch agreement shall be final and conclusive.”). Third parties, meanwhile, have no standing 
to challenge the treatment of taxpayers who submitted the agreements. See Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 135–36 (2011). And any attempt to challenge the IRS’s 
administrative guidance itself would be barred by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (explicitly barring declaratory judgments on 
most Federal tax law issues); I.R.C. § 7421(a) (explicitly barring “suit[s] for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax . . . in any court,” with limited exceptions); see 
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with 
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could guarantee proper legal authority by getting statutory 
authorization from Congress for its temporary shifts to liability rules. 
Patent law has a similar lack of legal authority in dealing with 
epidemics and bioterrorism. During the 2001 anthrax attacks, the 
nation lacked sufficient supplies of the patented antibiotic Cipro.358 
The secretary of Health and Human Services claimed that he lacked 
the legal authority to move to liability rule protection for the patent.359 
Thankfully the anthrax attacks stopped, but the episode provides a 
salutary warning on the importance of obtaining clear legal authority 
to move to liability rules during crises. 
C. Objections 
The previous two Sections analyzed the benefits of moving from 
property rules to liability rules during crises and of prearranging these 
moves. This Section considers two potential objections. 
1. Will Prearranged Moves Increases Crises’ Likelihood?  This 
Article has demonstrated how prearranged pliability rules can 
minimize the harm caused by crises. This Article has also discussed 
how pliability rules do not increase moral hazard, because liability rules 
require compensation.360 Indeed, prearranging pliability rules can even 
reduce moral hazard by keeping parties from expecting windfalls.361 
But one can reasonably ask whether prearranging pliability rules can 
increase the likelihood of crises due to shifts in ex ante incentives. This 
possibility cannot be ruled out when dealing with complex social 
systems and is a promising subject for future research by legal scholars 
and economists. 
Consider pliability rules in patent law that respond to quick-
spreading epidemics or bioterrorism. Prearranging moves to liability 
 
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1162–73 
(2008). 
 358. Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The Response; Administration Won’t Allow 
Generic Versions of Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/18/ 
us/nation-challenged-response-administration-won-t-allow-generic-versions-drug.html [https://
perma.cc/RL48-3E4W].  
 359. Id. (“Tommy G. Thompson, the health and human services secretary, said . . . that 
violating the patent on Cipro, the drug most recommended for treatment of anthrax, was illegal. 
But Mr. Thompson got an immediate argument from patent lawyers as well as from Senator 
Charles E. Schumer.”); cf. Letter to Tommy Thompson, supra note 350 (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 
1498 provided sufficient legal authority).  
 360. See supra notes 99, 154 and accompanying text.  
 361. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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rules for patented drugs would help fight the epidemic, but would also 
prevent the patent holder from reaping large profits during the 
epidemic. Taking away such possible profits might dampen incentives 
for research and development into new drugs in the first place.362 
A similar concern applies in tax law. Taking away one risk, that a 
crisis may result in inadvertently failing a devastating property rule, 
may make a taxpayer willing to take on more nontax risks. 
Cumulatively, many taxpayers taking greater nontax risks may 
increase the likelihood of a financial crisis. 
Recall that the property rule of § 956 kept U.S. corporations from 
borrowing cash from their foreign subsidiaries.363 Suppose that shifting 
this property rule to a liability rule temporarily during crises had been 
prearranged.364 This prearranged shift might have led U.S. 
corporations to borrow more from short-term capital markets, secure 
in the knowledge that if a crisis caused such financing to dry up, then 
they still could borrow from their foreign subsidiaries—albeit with 
compensation paid to the government. Such incentives would have led 
to more business debt, and more business debt makes the economy 
more prone to crises.365 But this prearranged shift would have had 
countervailing effects that might have reduced the risk of financial 
crises by preventing borrower bank runs. During the 2008–09 financial 
crisis, many U.S. corporations with lines of credit at troubled banks 
rushed to borrow as much as possible, just in case the troubled bank 
failed, causing the line of credit to disappear.366 This borrowing rush 
drained troubled banks of badly needed cash, furthering the financial 
crisis.367 If U.S. corporations had known that, in a crisis, they could 
 
 362. Rexford E. Santerre & John A. Vernon, Assessing Consumer Gains from a Drug Price 
Control Policy in the United States, 73 S. ECON. J. 233, 234 (2006). 
 363. See supra Part II.B.1. Section 956 was made largely irrelevant by the tax reform 
legislation passed in late 2017. See supra notes 194–96. 
 364. See supra notes 206–07 and discussion in accompanying text.  
 365. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF 
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 63–70 (Comm. Print 1989); accord INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, DEBT BIAS AND OTHER DISTORTIONS: CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES IN TAX POLICY 4 (2009), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XWH-GH97] (“tax 
distortions are likely to have contributed to the crisis by leading to levels of debt higher than 
would otherwise have been the case”).  
 366. Judit Montoriol-Garriga & Evan Sekeris, A Question of Liquidity: The Great Banking 
Run of 2008? 5–7 (Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., Working Paper QAU09-4, 2009), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.369.2175&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://
perma.cc/5VTE-NG8A].  
 367. Id. This line-of-credit bank run has led banking regulators to propose that banks 
maintain more capital in reserve against lines of credit. See J.P. MORGAN, CORPORATE FINANCE 
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borrow from their own foreign subsidiaries, such borrower bank runs 
would have been less likely, reducing the risk of financial crisis.368 In 
sum, prearranging this shift to a liability rule might increase or decrease 
the likelihood of a future financial crisis; the net effect, if any, is 
unclear. 
As another example, consider the liability rule proposed above for 
REMICs, letting them modify mortgages freely during crises, but 
imposing corporate tax on any profits from the modifications.369 A 
prearranged move to this rule would increase the likelihood that 
troubled mortgages will be modified,370 which might increase 
borrowers’ likelihood of taking out risky mortgages, which, in turn, 
would increase the likelihood of financial crises. This risk is likely 
small, since the mid-2000s housing bubble inflated despite property-
rule restrictions on REMICs modifying mortgages.371 Moreover, the 
potential availability of mortgage modification would give REMIC 
creators an incentive to screen out those mortgage borrowers most 
likely to require modification. Such screening could reduce the risk of 
future crises. Again, it is unclear whether this prearranged move would 
increase or decrease the likelihood of a financial crisis. Modeling the 
impact of such moves on risk is a particularly promising area for future 
economic research. 
2. Why Not Permanently Move to Liability Rules?  One can 
reasonably ask why not just change all potentially crisis-worsening 
requirements to liability rules, permanently. For example, all patented 
drugs that might fight epidemics or bioterrorism could be subject to 
 






 368. SENATE PSI REPORT, supra note 199, exhibit 3b (citing an internal Hewlett-Packard Co. 
presentation stating that “[t]he company has . . . lines of credit meant to be used if the [commercial 
paper] market should become unavailable to HP. However, should the [commercial paper] 
market disappear generally, the demand for draws on lines of credit would overwhelm the 
banking system”). 
 369. See supra Part II.B.5.  
 370. For a discussion on how REMIC organizational documents could accommodate the 
possible liability rule, see supra note 339 and accompanying text. 
 371. Research suggests that mortgage borrowers were unduly optimistic and did not even 
consider the downside possibilities. Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of 
Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1120–21 (2009). 
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compulsory license, at all times. As another example, the mutual fund 
90 percent distribution requirement could always be protected by a 
liability rule. 
The response is simple. During normal times, property rules have 
some advantages over liability rules. Scholars have generated an 
extensive literature on the relative merits of property rules versus 
liability rules in different circumstances, across a wide variety of 
substantive areas.372 When no crisis is raging, property rules may be 
superior for many reasons. If it is difficult to detect violations of a 
requirement, then protecting that requirement with a property rule 
may deter violations.373 Similarly, liability rules that apply at all times 
may invite opportunistic behavior.374 And calculating compensation 
due under a liability rule can be difficult or expensive.375 In many 
noncrisis situations, property rules have advantages over liability rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The IRS’s responses to the 2008–09 financial crisis demonstrate 
that moving from property rules to liability rules temporarily can 
minimize harm from a crisis, prevent windfalls, and even protect third 
parties like workers and homeowners. This approach has benefits in 
areas like constitutional law, patent law, and bankruptcy law. 
Counterintuitively, moving to total nonenforcement, which would 
seem even more lenient than moving to a liability rule, actually 
provides less relief. The IRS’s responses also reveal many previously 
unnoticed benefits of arranging shifts to liability rules before crises 
start, ranging from faster responses to more flexible private contracts. 
Policymakers should work now to prearrange shifts to liability rules to 
handle the inevitable future financial crises and epidemics. 
 
 
 372. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1176 nn.25–27. 
 373. Id. at 1200–10.  
 374. Id. at 1213–14 (noting the problems if liability-rule amounts are too low); Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 37, at 730–32 (discussing problems created by biased liability-rule amounts).  
 375. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 9, at 1214–16.  
